




EFN REPORT  
 





























About the European Forecasting Network 
The European Forecasting Network (EFN) is a research group of European 
institutions, founded in 2001 and co-financed by the European Commission. The 
objective of the EFN is to provide a critical analysis of the current economic situation 
in the euro area, short-term forecasts of the main macroeconomic and financial 
variables, policy advice, and in-depth study of topics of particular relevance for the 
working of the European Economic and Monetary Union. The EFN publishes two 
semi-annual reports, in the spring and in the autumn. Further information on the EFN 
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The Autumn 2004 report of the European Forecasting Network 
(EFN) presents a detailed analysis of the macroeconomic outlook 
and forecasts for the euro area and the new member states. It 
continues with eight studies on the working of the Lisbon Strategy 
and related issues. We first summarize the contents of each of the 
chapters, and the full report then follows. Additional details on each 
study can be found in a set of annexes available on the EFN web 
site at www.efn.uni-bocconi.it . 
 
Euro area outlook and Forecasts 
In the first half of 2004 and during the summer, world output has 
been expanding strongly. Constantly high and rising oil prices, 
however, have spread some doubts about the continuation of the 
upswing. This is true particularly for the US, where output growth 
slowed in the second quarter of 2004 and consumption in particular 
was less buoyant than expected. In addition, the strong stimulus
provided by US fiscal policy is declining while US monetary policy 
will become less expansive in the second half of 2004, further 
dampening the rapid expansion of output.  
The second centre of the upswing is East Asia with its two main 
economies, Japan and China. In Japan, however, like in the US, the 
economy slowed in the second quarter. While export expansion is 
still dynamic and consumer confidence is strong, the high 
investment dynamics from last winter seem to show signs of 
weakening, judging from data from the national accounts.  This is 
possibly due to the oil price hike. China is still booming, although 
administrative measures to prevent the economy from overheating 
started to dampen growth in demand during the summer.  
The euro area still lags behind the world-wide expansion. While 
economic activity picked up markedly during the first half of 2004, 
a strong upswing has not been realized, because investment growth 
has continued to be very slow. The revival was driven mainly by 
strong exports which benefited from a booming world economy 
and, to a lesser extent, by an expansion of private consumption.  
In the beginning of 2004, consumer spending grew more strongly
than in any quarter since the downswing started in 2001. In 
addition, consumer confidence indicators are marginally higher than 
last year. Thus, the widespread view that a low propensity to
consume of households has blocked the recovery of the economy is
not supported by the recent data. In general, it is difficult to argue 
that savings are too high in the euro area. Saving decisions appear 
to be rational given the higher awareness of sustainability problems 
of the pay-as-you-go pension systems. In addition, the bursting of 
the asset price bubble has reduced the wealth of private households, 
and the oil price hike has put downward pressure on real incomes. 
Clearly, further progress on structural reforms of the social security 
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What is importantly missing is a rebound of fixed capital 
investment which has instead stagnated for the last 3 ½ years by 
now. Thus, some need to modernize the capital stock should have 
accumulated, all the more so as nowadays a considerable share of 
the capital stock is fast depreciating ICT capital. Moreover, 
industrial production has been expanding since February, and short 
term indicators like business confidence or order books point to a 
continuation of the moderate upward trend for the second half of 
the year. Low real interest rates favour investment decisions. In 
addition, quarterly results of firms have turned out to be largely 
favourable during recent months, suggesting that internal terms of 
financing are improving. However, capacity utilization in the 
manufacturing sector, which stood at about 81% in the middle of 
2004, according to business survey data of the European 
Commission, is still rather low. Real unit labour costs have been 
rising during most of the last three years, and are falling only since 
the last quarter of 2003. They will slowly continue to fall during the 
course of this year and the next. This implies that the profitability of 
production will gradually improve. All in all, investment will not be 
the driving force of economic activity before the turn of the year. 
While this impedes the upswing in the short run, the relatively weak 
investment activity over the past decade is a cause for concern for 
the long-run competitiveness of European firms. 
Overall, production in the euro area will expand by 1.8% in 2004 
and by 1.9% in 2005: see Figure 1. Taking a supply side 
perspective, about 72% of growth is generated by the services 
sector. The index of industrial production excluding construction
will instead grow at average annual rates of 2.3 and 2.4% in 2004 
and 2005 respectively, with the sectors producing non-durable 
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Figure 1  Quarterly GDP growth rates and confidence bands 
 






































Historical inflation mean (1995-2002)                            Source: Eurostat & IFL    Date: September 16, 2004 
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The rise in the unemployment rate has been quite moderate in 
comparison with previous cycles. The greater resilience of the labour 
market seems to be attributable to structural reforms in the second 
half of the 1990s such as the higher availability of temporary 
contracts. This has increased the job content of growth. But even a 
more flexible labour market reacts to the business cycle with some 
delay. Business expectations about the evolution of employment point 
only to a slow improvement in the coming months, and the 
unemployment rate will decrease only in 2005, while the participation 
rate will not resume the rising trend it had at the time before the 
economic downturn. Surely, there is still potential for increasing the 
job content of economic growth by further reforming the European 
labour markets. Further reforms should comprise less complicated 
opening clauses for collectively bargained wages and working times, 
and a stronger role for firm level bargaining. 
The main upward innovations in inflation come from international 
crude oil prices in euros and from a greater impact than was initially 
estimated of tobacco tax changes in some member countries. On the 
other hand, in the core index, which excludes unprocessed-food and 
energy prices, all its main components except tobacco have 
experienced mild downward innovations. Taken together, the forecast 
for total inflation is 2.1%  for 2004 and 1.9% for 2005, see Figure 2. 
This, while reducing the scope of the ECB for following looser 
monetary policy, should not lead it to increase interest rates as a 
reaction to higher raw material prices, provided that the unions do not 
obtain a large compensation for the price increases. In that event the 
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For the New 
Member States, 
GDP growth will 
jump to at least 
5.2% in 2004 
and remain over 
4% in the 
following years 
 
The EFN forecasts for the main macroeconomic variables in the 
euro area are summarized in Table 1.
New Member States: Macroeconomic Outlook and Forecasts 
Even before their accession, most of the key economies in the 
region were recording improved performances, with GDP growth 
accelerating in the first quarter of 2004.  Average annual GDP 
growth in the region is bound to recover from a preliminary 4.5% in 
2003. Our growth forecast for 2004 and beyond is somewhat more 
optimistic than in our last report. Growth has surprised us on the 
upside in the first half of 2004, mostly in the case of the economies 
that have relied on net exports as the key driver of growth in the last 
several quarters. According to our latest forecasts, GDP growth will 
jump to 5.2% this year, driven by strong performances in Poland 
and Slovakia, recoveries in growth in the Czech Republic and 
Hungary and the continued boom in the Baltics. Our projections for 
2004 may well be pushed further upwards based on the very 
Table 1:  Economic outlook for the euro area 
  2001 2002 2003 2004: 2004: annual 2005: annual










GDP 1.6 0.8 0.5 1.6 1.8 2.1 1.9 2.5
1.6 1.2
Potential Output 2.5 2.4 2.2 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.8 2.3
1.1 1.2
Private Consumption 1.8 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.6 1.8 2.4
1.3 1.0Government 
Consumption 2.5 3.0 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.7 1.4 1.9
0.0 0.3
Fixed Capital Formation -0.3 -2.9 -0.6 0.6 1.0 1.9 3.0 5.7
5.4 4.5
Exports 3.3 1.5 0.1 5.6 6.0 6.6 6.4 8.3
4.9 5.0
Imports 1.7 0.3 1.9 4.6 5.6 6.4 7.0 9.1
8.9 8.7
Unemployment Rate 8.0 8.5 8.9 9.0 9.0 9.1 9.0 9.4
8.4 8.5
NAIRU 8.6 8.4 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.9
2.1 2.2
Labour Cost Index 3.4 3.5 2.7 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.7 3.1
1.4 1.1
Labour Productivity 0.3 0.2 0.0 1.4 1.7 2.1 1.9 2.7
1.6 1
HICP 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.6 1.9 2.9





Percentage change in the average level compared with the same period a year earlier, except for unemployment rate 
and NAIRU that are expressed in levels. Labour productivity is measured as a long run concept and refers to 
employment potential. Point forecasts and 80% confidence bounds are taken from the EFN forecasting model and are 









































positive results that were recorded in the first six months of this
year. The outlook for growth for all of the New Member States is 
very good with annual rates in the 4-4.5% range in the coming 
years.  
Despite a modest acceleration of inflation in all of the New Member 
States, the risk of a major resurgence in inflation is not significant 
in the short- to medium-term future.  Overall inflation rates are 
likely to peak sometime later this year and start declining again in 
2005 and beyond. In most cases, inflationary performance is not 
likely to constitute an obstacle to the New Member States’ quest for 
future membership in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). 
While the smaller New Member States, such as the Baltics, 
Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta can conceivably adopt the euro as early 
as in 2007-2008, the four largest, Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Slovakia, have a more difficult task for the next 
several years, with the prospect of adopting the euro now being 
pushed back to as far as 2010. Continued problems in containing 
fiscal deficits are at the core of this challenge. The current fiscal ills 
in the region are not going to disappear in the short-to-medium term 
unless growth reaches 4-5% annually across the region and budget 
spending is seriously curtailed.  In our Spring 2004 report, we 
indicated that the fiscal situation across the region was not very 
rosy. Unfortunately, the situation has not improved much in the 
interim.  Fiscal challenges will also make interest rate convergence 
more difficult. Having switched to a more cautious approach to 
interest rate reductions during 2003, the monetary authorities in 
most of the New Member States set a steady course late last year 
and early this year by keeping rate adjustments to an absolute 
minimum. While there is arguably still room for further interest rate 
cuts in many of the countries, most notably Slovakia and Hungary, 
the authorities cannot ignore the first signs of gathering inflationary 
pressures.  
 
What success has been achieved in hitting the Lisbon targets? 
In the 2000 Lisbon Council the heads of European Union countries 
stated as their goal the establishment of “the most competitive and 
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of 
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater 
social cohesion” by 2010. To achieve this, it was intended that an 
array of economic and structural reforms called the Lisbon Strategy 
had to be implemented.  At the time the macroeconomic backdrop 
to the proposals was particularly propitious – with hindsight – the
world economy was at a cyclical peak. After four years of poor 
economic performance the euro area is now recovering on the back 
of a strong revival in the US and Asia.  However, the coordination 
of fiscal policy through the mechanism of the Stability and Growth 
Pact is in tatters and 6 countries have deficits in excess of 3 % of 
output. 
Setting a date of 2010 as the time by which the necessary supply 
side changes should be implemented and given an opportunity to 
boost productive capacity was always very optimistic. Nevertheless, 
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political horizon was more likely to infuse the reform process with a 
sense of urgency. However, in many cases the cyclical slowdown 
since 2000 and rising unemployment has dented any enthusiasm for 
major change and the supply side reforms – particularly in the large 
countries of continental Europe – have failed to materialise. 
The recent assessment by the European Commission on the progress 
in achieving the Strategy’s goal is mixed: Denmark, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have 
achieved good results, while Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal have 
performed relatively poorly. Our own evaluation is even more 
negative, as detailed in the next Chapter. 
 
Rethinking the monitoring of the Lisbon strategy’s targets 
To measure and monitor the Lisbon’s strategy, a complex system of 
hundreds of indicators was developed. The Commission reduced the 
list to only 14 Structural Indicators in 2004, which are related to the 
five main areas of the Lisbon Strategy and to the General Economic 
Background. 
According to the Commission, more than six million jobs have been 
created since 1999, several key markets have been completely or 
partially opened up to competition, the knowledge-based economy is 
becoming a reality, the sustainable development approach is being 
taken more fully into account in policymaking; and, some one 
hundred regulations, directives and programmes have been adopted in 
different fields, all pursuing the Lisbon goals. But there are still a 
number of major problems, including the need for public finances to 
be viable, the unsatisfactory contribution of employment and 
productivity to growth, the disappointing development of the internal
market and, the lack of sustainability of growth.  
Our empirical analysis illustrates that euro area GDP per capita 
growth is positively correlated with growth in human capital, 
employment and business investment. Another important factor 
influencing growth is the innovation and research process: increases 
in patents, in youth education attainment levels and in science and 
technology graduates have run parallel to growth rates, while 
increases in spending on human resources are not particularly 
important. Similar results are obtained both from estimating growth 
equations and evaluating the main components of composite 
indicators. 
These empirical findings could be periodically re-evaluated and 
represent an interesting complement to the Commission’s review of
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Supply-side reforms in Europe: Can the Lisbon Strategy be 
repaired? 
As noted in the previous Chapter, the progress of the Lisbon strategy 
is rather slow and there is little sign that Europe’s economic decline is 
stopping or turning around, particularly in the large countries of 
continental Europe. There is also substantial agreement on what 
should be done to improve the long run economic outlook, at least at 
a general level. Yet, the economic reforms that are needed are not 
being implemented, or are being enacted too slowly. What can be 
done to speed up the pace of reforms? What are the most urgent 
priorities? In particular, what role should the EU play in bringing 
about supply side reforms? In which areas of supply side policy, if 
any, is the need for European coordination more acute?  How can the 
current institutional framework for coordination of supply side 
policies be improved?  These are the issues addressed in this chapter. 
 
The impact of ICT on hourly labour productivity 
We propose an accounting assessment of hourly labour productivity 
growth, in an international perspective, focusing more particularly on 
information and communication technologies (ICT). As a matter of 
fact, ICT, viewed as all-purpose technologies, is associated with a 
third industrial revolution, as these increase growth potential and 
bring about productivity gains. Therefore, ICT is a key element 
within the Lisbon Strategy.  
The results for the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and 
France reveal a division between countries. All four countries display
total factor productivity (TFP) gains but paradoxically, over the 1995-
2001 period, these gains are weakest in the United States and the 
United Kingdom. Over the nineties, TFP gains accelerate in France, 
in Germany and in the United States. On the contrary, they slow 
down in the United Kingdom though from a high level over the 1990-
1995 period. Hourly labour productivity gains are comparable across 
the four countries, but the highest contributions of ICT in the United 
States (0.91 point of percentage) and in the United Kingdom (0.85 
point) is compensated by lower TFP gains in both countries. The 
evolution of the labour quality contribution underlines too the 
possible mismatch between labour and capital, entailing lower TFP 
gains, as the increase in unskilled labour (as measured by education) 
in the United States has brought about a deterioration of labour 
quality over the 1995-2001 period. In France, the fall in labour quality 
is due to demographics, with the workers aged 54 and more leaving 
the labour market. 
The sectoral analysis carried out for France, the United Kingdom and 
the United States shows that productivity gains were especially large 
in ICT-producer industries, in each of these countries. Hourly labour 
productivity in the ICT producing sector grew by between 12 and 14 
per cent in the three countries between 1995 and 2001. Productivity 
gains also show a marked acceleration over the nineties. Accordingly, 
TFP gains also increase at a sustained pace. 
Key components to 
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In the ICT-user sector, service industries, the productivity 
acceleration over the second half of the nineties is generalised and 
strong (except in the United Kingdom in terms of hours). In the 
United Kingdom, and even more in the United States, the levels 
reached during the past period are astonishing for industries 
belonging to the service sector, with average yearly gains by 
respectively 2.41 and 3.87 per cent for hourly labour productivity, 
1.65 and 2.54 percentage points for TFP. These unusual levels 
suggest huge productivity spill-over effects linked to ICT are 
underway, to the extent that the contribution of ICT capital deepening 
is great in both cases (0.66 and 0,99 point of % per year respectively). 
It is noteworthy that the strong TFP gains recorded in the user sector 
in these two countries point to spill-over effects not limited to the 
producer sector.  
ICT explains well the increase in hourly productivity in the US and 
UK but not in France. In this country, the gains in hourly productivity 
are high in the manufacturing sector (around 4% between 1995-
2001), which is nevertheless less intensive in ICT than services. 
However, measurement problems affecting services call for caution in 
interpreting the link between ICT capital deepening and productivity 
gains in France, especially in banking and finance. 
 
Does deregulation of factor markets affect the path of long term
growth? 
According to modern growth theories, policy and institutional settings 
have an impact on the path of long term economic growth. To some 
extent, regulation is necessary to ensure the functioning of market 
economies, for example in the areas of competition, consumer 
protection, property rights and environment. Institutions can increase 
efficiency by correcting market failure. On the other hand, 
overregulation might worsen resource allocation and the incentives 
for innovation, thereby exerting adverse effects on long term growth. 
While the impact of institutions on the macroeconomic performance 
is well established by sound theoretical models, empirical evidence is 
not so clear-cut. Therefore, we have analysed the empirical link 
between institutions and growth. Due to data availability, the focus is 
mostly on factor market institutions. Several panel estimation 
methods are used in order to get more robust results. We also 
investigate the relevance of measurement errors that result from a 
varying composition of the deregulation indicators. 
Once measurement errors are controlled for, the alternative models 
show very similar results. Overall, advances in deregulation will 
improve the macroeconomic performance. Institutions will affect 
growth mainly through the capital deepening channel. This points to 
the relevance of institutions during the catching-up process to the 
technological frontier. In contrast, the impact of institutions on steady 
state growth seems to be almost insignificant. In fact, the link might 
be more complex and may be transmitted through the determinants of 
technological progress, including research and development and 
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The impact of institutions on the European employment 
performance in European labour markets, 1979-2001 
Rigidities in national labour markets are widely seen as responsible for 
the weak employment performance in Europe. The average 
unemployment rate is 8 percent, and is predicted to be stable for the 
near future. A substantial part is due to long term unemployment: 45 
percent of the unemployed are unemployed for longer than 12 months. 
The high unemployment rates are accompanied by lower employment 
and participation rates. Currently, EU15 employment rates are 65 
percent, which is not far below the Lisbon goal. But the gaps are wider 
for young people, older workers and women. Long term unemployment 
rates exceed the average in Germany, Italy and Spain. Employment 
rates are relatively low in Belgium, Greece, Italy and Spain. To some 
extent, labour market institutions can account for this outcome, as they 
may postpone the reallocation of labour in response to structural 
shocks. We investigate their impact on the employment record, where 
the latter is measured, inter alia, by the employment rate, the threshold 
of employment and the marginal intensity of employment. 
According to the empirical results, greater union power and stricter
employment protection lower the employment rate. Where union power
increases wages above the competitive equilibrium, employment
prospects are worsened, leading to a decline in participation. A rise in
the tax wedge and a more generous unemployment benefit system tend
to reduce the employment rate, emphasizing the relevance of policies
that increase the incentives for households to work. Higher union power
will raise the threshold of employment, especially when unemployment
benefits are more generous. This effect is partly offset by a high degree
of coordination in wage bargaining. Employment protection legislation
is most important for the marginal intensity. Stronger protection will
reduce the job content of output growth. The best fitting models point to
some interaction of employment protection with other institutional and
business cycle variables. A decline in the marginal intensity is expected,
if union power is high, and the unemployment benefit system is more
generous. The results point to a comprehensive strategy, emphasizing
the relevance of policies that increase the incentives for households to
work. 
 
Competition and the advent of the euro 
We have investigated the proposition that markets in the euro area 
economies have become more competitive with the advent of the euro. 
The increased competition stems from more transparent price 
comparisons and the removal of both exchange rate risk and the buying 
and selling spreads in foreign exchange markets. These changes lower 
the total cost and uncertainty to consumers of purchasing goods 
produced or sold in other euro area countries and make markets more 
integrated. 
How might the increased competition manifest itself? In response to the 
now relatively cheaper imports, firms may lower their prices and 
markup. One could imagine the extreme case where prices and the 
markup fall so that relative prices in each country are unaffected by the 
introduction of the euro meaning that the distribution of sales remains 
the same and measures of industry concentration are unaffected. 
Another response may be for firms to merge which would reduce 





Europe is quite 




























Have markets in 
the euro area 
become more 
competitive with 
the advent of 
the euro? 
 
A fall in the 
markup signals 











































Therefore, there may be two opposing forces on both the markup and 
competition following the introduction of the euro. The difficulty is to 
judge if competition has on balance increased in the face of these 
opposing forces. One way to proceed is to focus on the market 
outcome in terms of the firm’s surplus profit, or in practical terms, the 
markup. A fall in the markup implies that there is a net benefit to 
consumers and a net loss to firms, which is consistent with the 
outcome that would ensue if there were an increase in competition. 
Therefore, one indirect measure of competition would be the markup,
such that a decrease in the markup, all else being equal, is 
concomitant with a net increase in competition. 
We show that although the markup has varied considerably since the 
introduction of the euro most of this variation can be explained by the 
movement of inflation and the business cycle. Therefore if we take 
changes in the markup as a proxy for changes in competitiveness we 
do not find any evidence of a pro-competitive impact of the creation 
of the euro area. This may be due to the fact that we are still in a 
period of transition or that the data are insufficient for making the 
kinds of distinctions necessary. The impact of the euro on competition 
therefore remains an open question and one with considerable interest 
for policy makers in light of the aims of the Lisbon strategy. 
 
Financial Integration of European stock markets 
This chapter aims at investigating the financial integration process in 
Europe compared to the rest of the world over the last decade. We 
analyse the dynamics of daily returns for 90 country-and-sector 
indices in Europe as well as in the rest of the world. Returns are 
obtained from the Datastream database. They cover eleven countries 
from the euro area and nine countries or zones from the rest of the 
world over 1990:1-2002:08. Returns are expressed in euros (or Ecus) 
for euro area countries, and in dollars for all other countries. Hence, 
the integration measure of each zone (euro area, rest of the world) is 
not affected by exchange-rate variations. 
Our measure of integration draws on dynamic factor analysis, using a 
rolling window of one or three years. We show financial integration 
to be always higher in the euro area than in the rest of the world. For 
the euro area, our measure of integration across countries rises 
sharply in 1997-1998; it then declines slightly. For the rest of the 
world, integration rises only slightly in 1997-1998, and stays constant 
afterwards. We conclude that financial integration has been at play in 
the euro area in the 1997-1998 period, and that integration has 
remained at a higher level afterwards. Conversely, the sector-based 
integration measure tends to decline over the whole period, both in 
the euro area and in the rest of the world. The fall is especially 
marked in 1999-2000, probably due to the bursting of the “dot.com”
bubble. At the beginning of the period, the sectoral component is 
dominant in explaining the co-movements of the returns. This is no 
longer true at the end of the period for the euro area, due to the scissor 
evolution of the country-based integration (which rises) and of the 
sector-based integration (which declines). At the end of the period, 
the integration measure is about the same for countries and for sectors 
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Euro Area Outlook and Forecasts
Economic Outlook for 2004 and 2005 
  
In the first half of 2004 and during the summer, world output 
has been expanding strongly. Constantly high and rising oil 
prices, however, spread some doubts about the continuation of 
the upswing. This is true particularly for the US, where output 
growth slowed in the second quarter and consumption was less 
buoyant than expected. In addition, the strong stimulus of  US 
fiscal policy is declining and monetary policy will become less 
expansive in the second half of 2004, further dampening the 
fast output expansion.  
The second centre of the upswing is East Asia with its two 
main economies, Japan and China. In Japan, however, as in the 
US, the economy slowed in the second quarter. While export 
expansion is still dynamic and consumer confidence is strong, 
the high investment levels of  last winter seem to  have 
weakened according to data from the national accounts, 
possibly due to the oil price hike. China is still booming, 
although administrative measures to prevent the economy from 
overheating started to dampen growth in demand during the 
summer.  
In the midst of a worldwide upswing, the euro area is still the 
least dynamic of the large economic regions. That said, the 
economy performed somewhat better than generally expected 
during the first half of the year, helped by strong export 
growth. The improvement in  expectations can be seen in figure 
1.1, which shows the Economic Sentiment Indicator for the 
euro area with the interval forecasts with base on January and 
July 2004. 
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In 2005, the worldwide upswing is expected to lose some 
momentum. The slowdown will be due to the receding stimuli 
in the US, the effects of the administrative measures in China, 
and the dampening effects of the high oil prices. On the other 
hand, the revival in the euro area will gain some momentum in 
the ensuing months and the growth dynamics particularly in 
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East Asia appear to be strong enough to ensure a healthy 
expansion of world output in this year and in 2005. Thus, 
world trade is expected to expand at 7.8% in 2004. Due to the 
recovery of the euro area and the implied lag structure, the rate 
of growth is expected to be slightly higher in 2005 (8.2%).  
While world production fulfilled the expectations of an 
upswing in the first half of the year, stock market indices in the 
US and in Europe have declined during the summer to their 
levels of late 2003. This suggests that the markets have priced 
in a considerable amount of risk. Above all, the recent oil price 
hike has clouded the prospects. This came at a time when the 
booms in the US and in China already appear to have peaked.  
The strained markets for crude oil are partly the result of 
instability in many oil producing countries. At the same time, 
they are part of  the broader picture of high commodity prices, 
due to strong growth of demand from the US and from China. 
The general upward trend of commodity prices appears to have 
eased, but the price for crude oil is about 13 Dollars higher 
than the average in 2003, around 41 US-Dollars per barrel 
(Brent) in September. In this forecast we assume that the oil 
price will only slightly decrease  with an average of 37 Dollars 
both in the year 2004 and 2005. Under this assumption, the oil 
price hike will dampen the world wide upswing, but it will not 
put an end to it (see Box 1.2).  
A constant risk to the stability of the world economy is the 
large US-current account deficit, which, relative to GDP, 
exceeded the 5% threshold in the first half of this year. The 
stability of the US economy depends on it remaining an 
attractive place for foreign financial investment. Recently, 
however, the most important investors were East Asian central 
banks, mainly those of Japan and China. Thus, the stability of 
the US-Dollar depends to some degree on the stability of the 
monetary strategy of these countries. Japan in particular helps 
to finance the US-current account deficit partly because it aims 
at an expansion of the Yen monetary aggregates: an 
unsterilized purchase of Dollar assets raises the Japanese 
monetary base. But this expansive monetary policy only makes 
sense as long as the Bank of Japan has to fight deflation. With 
the Japanese economy in an upswing, a moderately positive 
inflation rate might be achieved some time in 2005. At this 
point, the Japanese central bank might cease to be an important 
investor in US assets. Therefore, the risk of turbulences in the 
currency markets appears to be higher at the end of our 
forecasting horizon than they are now. 
The euro area still lags behind the world wide expansion. 
While economic activity picked up markedly during the first 
half of 2004, a strong upswing has not been realized, because 
investment growth was still very slow. The revival was mainly 
driven by strong exports which benefited from a booming 
world economy and, to a lesser extent, by an expansion of 
private consumption.  
To some degree, strong export growth during the last decade is 
just a consequence of the rising international integration of 
production processes. It has been argued recently that a large 
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intermediate goods produced in and imported from more 
competitive emerging market economies. Moreover, a growth
rate of imports lower than that of exports could be explained by 
a decreasing domestic demand for imports. If these points were 
correct, the recent strong expansion of exports would generate 
little domestic income. Econometric analysis of the dependence 
of German imports on exports and domestic demand indeed 
shows that this effect has increased in the process of 
globalization; but it does not compensate for the stimulating 
effects of a foreign demand increase.. Thus, the recent export 
boom in all likelihood generates considerable domestic income 
and improves the chances for the European economy to come 
out of stagnation. 
In the beginning of 2004, consumer spending grew more 
strongly  than in any quarter since the downswing started in 
2001. Consumer confidence indicators are slightly higher than 
last year. Thus, the widespread opinion that a low propensity of 
households to consume blocks the recovery of the economy is 
not supported by the recent data. In general, it is difficult to 
argue that savings are too high in the euro area. Saving 
decisions appear to be rational given the higher awareness of 
the sustainability problems of  pay-as-you-go pension systems. 
Clearly, further progress on structural reforms of the social 
security systems would strengthen the confidence of 
households. In addition, the bursting of the asset price bubble 
has reduced the wealth of private households, and the oil price 
hike puts a downward pressure on real incomes.  
What is missing from the picture is a rebound of fixed capital 
investment which has been stagnant for 3 ½ years by now. 
Thus, some need to modernize the capital stock should have 
accumulated, all the more so as nowadays a considerable share 
of the capital stock is fast depreciating ICT capital. Moreover, 
industrial production has been expanding since February 
(except for June), and short term indicators like business 
confidence or order books point to a continuation of the 
moderate upward trend for the second half of the year. Low 
real interest rates favour investment decisions. In addition, the 
quarterly results of firms have turned out to be largely 
favourable during recent months, suggesting that internal terms 
of financing are improving. However, capacity utilization in 
the manufacturing sector, about 81% in the mid of 2004 
according to business survey data of the European 
Commission, is still rather low. Real unit labour costs  had 
been rising during most of the last three years, and are falling 
only since the last quarter of 2003. They will slowly continue 
to do so this year and the next. This means that the profitability 
of production will gradually improve. All in all, investment 
will not be the driving force of economic activity before the 
turn of the year. Not only does this impede the upswing in the 
short run, the relatively weak investment activity over the past 
decade is a cause for concern for the long run competitiveness 
of European firms. 
Overall, production in the euro area will expand by 1.8% in 
2004 and by 1.9% in 2005, see Figures 1.2 and 1.3. This year 
the output gap continues to widen. It will shrink in 2005 but 
will still amount to about 1.2% of GDP at the end of that year. 
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Figure 1.2:  Quarterly GDP growth rates and confidence bands 
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    Table 1.1: CONTRIBUTIONS OF PRODUCTION SECTORS  
Year GDP growth Agriculture Industrial Construction Services Net taxes
1999 2.8% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 2.1% 0.3% 
2000 3.5% 0.0% 0.9% 0.1% 2.6% -0.1% 
2001 1.6% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 1.7% -0.2% 
2002 0.9% 0.0% 0.1% -0.1% 0.9% -0.1% 
2003 0.5% -0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% -0.1% 
2004 1.8% 0.0% 0.5% 0.0% 1.3% 0.0% 
2005 1.9% 0.0% 0.5% 0.0% 1.4% 0.0% 
 
Taking a supply-side perspective, see Table 1.1, the 
construction sector, which has been falling slightly since 2001, 
will register a small positive contribution to GDP growth in 
2004. The industrial sector will go from zero contribution in 
2003 to five tenths of a percentage point in 2004, while the 
services sector will be responsible for about 72% of GDP 
growth in 2004 and 2005. 
The observation of the index of industrial production for July 
has confirmed the expected recovery, which has been better 
than the forecast, but with annual rates above what was 
expected in our last report in January (2.3% and 2.4% in 2004 
and 2005 respectively instead of 1.8% as forecasted 
previously). Figure 1.4 shows the change in expectations in the 
last EFN reports. 
 
Source: Eurostat & EFN                           Date: September 21 st, 2004






June 01 June 02 June 03 June 04 
Observed July-03 January-04 July-04 
The average annual rates of growth for the different industrial 
sectors classified according to the destination of goods are 
shown in table 1.2. It can be seen that recovery continues in 
2004 in all components except energy, which was growing at 
2.9% in 2003. In 2004 and 2005, the non-energy sectors with 
lower rates of growth will be the sector producing non-durable 
consumer goods. 
Table 1.2 ANNUAL AVERAGE RATES FOR INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION IN EURO AREA(***) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Capital 6.7 2.4 8.2 1.6 -1.6 -0.1 3.6 3.8 
Durable 4.2 1.3 6.1 -2.1 -5.6 -4.3 2.5 1.9 
Intermediate 3.7 1.9 6.2 -0.6 0.2 0.4 2.2 2.9 
Non Durable 2.1 1.2 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.1 0.6 1.1 
Energy 1.6 0.8 1.9 1.3 1.1 2.9 2.0 0.6 
Total EMU 3.8 1.8 5.2 0.4 -0.5 0.3 2.3 2.4 
(***)Bold figures are forecasts. Working day adjusted data. 
Source: Eurostat and UC3M.  
Date: September, 21st 2004
In 2003, industrial production in the euro area registered a rate 
of growth similar to the one registered in the US, but in 2004 
and 2005 industrial growth will be significantly higher in the 
US than in the euro area, with annual mean rates of growth in
2004 of 4.6% in US and 2.3% in Europe. 
The rise in the unemployment rate has been quite moderate in
comparison to previous cycles. Although the recent downturn 
started in 2001, the NAIRU in the euro area is still almost 2 
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resilience of the labour market seems to be caused by structural 
reforms in the second half of the 1990s like higher availability 
of temporary contracts. This has increased the job content of 
growth. But even a more flexible labour market  reacts to the 
business cycle with some delay. Business expectations about 
the evolution of employment point only to a slow improvement 
in the coming months, and the unemployment rate will decrease 
only in 2005, while the participation rate will not resume the 
rising trend it had at the time before the economic downturn. 
There is still potential for increasing the job content of 
economic growth by further reforming the European labour 
markets. Further reforms should comprise less complicated 
opening clauses for collectively bargained wages and working 
times, and a stronger role for firm-level negotiations. 
The forecast of a slowly improving labour market needs a 
caveat: if the unions tried to achieve compensation for the oil 
price rise for workers, employment will suffer from two 
adverse effects. First, labour would become more expensive 
relative to capital. Second, the ECB would step in by raising 
interest rates, because it will not be willing to accommodate a 
wage-price spiral. Otherwise, the chances are good that ECB 
interest rates will stay low, with only a moderate increase of 
about half a percentage point in 2005. 
The main upward innovations in inflation come from 
international crude oil prices in euros and from a greater impact 
than was initially estimated of tobacco tax changes in some 
member countries. On the other hand, in the core index, which 
excludes unprocessed-food and energy prices, all its main 
components except tobacco have experienced mild downward 
innovations. Overall, the expectations for the 2004 average 
annual total inflation rate have been updated from the 1.8% 
advanced in the last report to 2.1% and the corresponding core 
inflation rate continues at 2.1%. (see figure 1.5).   
For 2005, future crude oil markets do not indicate further major 
price increases and the year-on-year total inflation rate will 
systematically decrease from 2.3% at the beginning of the year 
to 1.8% in the last quarter, with an annual average of 1.9%. 
Core inflation will be relatively stable around 2.0%. The effects 
of the oil price hike on inflation in the euro area seem to be 
rather moderate. (see figure 1.5). 
The monthly forecasts for 2004 and 2005 and the uncertainty 
surrounding them are shown in figure 1.5 by means of a fan 
chart. It shows that the probability of an inflation rate 
systematically higher than 2% throughout 2004 is high, but will 
fall considerably by mid 2005. 
Total inflation has been higher than 2% since mid-2000. 
Initially, see figure 1.6, this was due to unprocessed food and 
energy prices, because core inflation was considerably lower 
than that figure. However, in 2001 and 2002, core prices have 
been the main obstacle to a total inflation rate of 2%, and the 
expectations for 2004 and 2005 are that core inflation will show 
minor oscillations around 2%. In 2004 this problem is 
aggravated by the evolution of energy prices. Shocks in core 
prices have greater persistent effects than shocks in other 
prices, meaning that deviations of core inflation over 2% are 
going to have more persistent implications than deviations of 
similar relative importance in other prices. 
The rise in the 
unemployment 
rate has been 
relatively 
moderate due to 
labour market 











Due to higher 
prices in crude 
oil the euro area 
inflation forecast 
has been 




Core will be 
relatively stable 
around 2.0% 
during the rest 
























Historical inflation mean (1995-2002)             


























2003-01 2003-02 2003-03 2003-04 2004-01 2004-02 2004-03 2004-04 2005-01 2005-02 2005-03 2005-04
Changes in import prices Output gap
Others explainatory variables and innovations ** Deviation of money from nominal output
Quarter inflation forecast Historical inflation mean * ( 1.93 % in annualized rate.)
Observations in quarter inflation
    Figure 1.5   Contributions to the  seasonally adjusted quarter-to-quarter inflation rate in the  EMU *
* The contributions refer to the deviations of inflation rate from their mean.
** Oher variables contain:  Inflation transitory dynamics, desviations from unit labor cost and effects explained at sectoral levels.    Date:  August 23 
rd, 2004
Date: September 16th 2004 
Figure 1 7: Contributions to the seasonally ajusted-to-quarter inflation rate in euro zone
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Core inflation in the euro area has been below that of the  US –
using an homogeneous measure for both areas - for several 
years before 2002.  But in 2002 and 2003 euro-area core 
inflation was nine tenths and seven tenths of a percentage point 
higher than US core inflation, respectively. This is an 
indication that monetary policy possibilities in the two 
countries have been different in this period. 
Breaking down the total inflation forecasts by means of an 
econometric model in terms of the contributions of the 
explanatory variables, it can be seen (see figure 1.7) that 
throughout 2003 and in the first quarter of 2004, the effect of 
monetary policy which has been pushing up inflation has been 
compensated by the effects in the opposite direction due to 
changes in import prices and the output gap. This suggests that 
a looser monetary policy could have been possible during this 
period. However for the rest of 2004 and the first part of 2005 
import prices will add additional pressure to inflation which 
will not be compensated by the output gap effects. At the end 
of 2005 the inflation-lowering effects of the output gap on 
inflation will be reduced. All this suggests that there is no room 
for a looser monetary policy for the time being and that a 
tighter monetary policy can be expected in the second half of 
2005. 
The reduction of the inflation rate in 2005 is due to a reduction 
in the rate of growth of energy and tobacco prices. All other 
prices of goods will experience slightly higher rates of growth 
than in 2004 and service prices will maintain a rate around 
2.6%. In the US, total inflation will increase to 2.7% in 2004 to 
drop to 1.9% in 2005. In this case the effect of energy prices on 
the fall in inflation is greater than in Europe, due to the fact that 
these prices fluctuate much more in the US than in Europe, 
because they include less indirect taxation. US core inflation is 
expected to increase around half a percentage point in 2005. 
Inflation forecasts for the euro area reveal significant 
differences between countries, leading to a range of actual real
interest rates across the member countries.  For the one year 
horizon, these go from negative values in Luxembourg (-
0.91%), Ireland, Spain (-0.62%), Portugal and Italy (-0.19%) to 
positive values in Finland (1.80%), Germany (0.98%), France 
(0.71%), Austria, Netherlands and Belgium (0.14%). This 
range is narrower than in past years and, in fact, except in 
Finland all member countries are experiencing near zero or 
negative real interest rates, which should favour business 
investment. On the consumption side, these real interest rates 
are bringing considerable pressure to bear on housing prices. 
As opposed to the consumer price index in the US, the HICP in 
the euro area does not include owner’s equivalent rent of 
primary residence, which represents around 20% of the CPI in 
the US. Furthermore, in the euro area there is not yet an index 
of owner-occupied housing prices, from which an inflation 
measure for this sector could be derived. Since the ECB should 
control prices in the whole economy, this type of index is 
certainly needed. Information on housing prices in different 
member countries show high inflation rates in recent years in 
this market, with possible bubbles in some of them. It seems 
that the exclusion of prices of owner-occupied houses from the 
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Since May 2004 eight Central European and two Mediterranean 
countries have joined the European Union. The impact on the 
euro area for 2004 and 2005 is small. Even the long run 
economic effects on the current members are minor (see the 
EFN spring report of 2003).  This is also true for the short run, 
more so as the institutional integration is not a one-off event but 
a process that takes place in the years before and after the 
accession date. 
The EFN outlook and forecasts for the euro area are 
summarized in Table 1.3. 
           Table 1.3:  Economic outlook for the euro area 
  2001 2002 2003 2004: 2004: annual 2005: annual










GDP 1.6 0.8 0.5 1.6 1.8 2.1 1.9 2.5
1.6 1.2
Potential Output 2.5 2.4 2.2 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.8 2.3
1.1 1.2
Private Consumption 1.8 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.6 1.8 2.4
1.3 1.0Government 
Consumption 2.5 3.0 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.7 1.4 1.9
0.0 0.3
Fixed Capital Formation -0.3 -2.9 -0.6 0.6 1.0 1.9 3.0 5.7
5.4 4.5
Exports 3.3 1.5 0.1 5.6 6.0 6.6 6.4 8.3
4.9 5.0
Imports 1.7 0.3 1.9 4.6 5.6 6.4 7.0 9.1
8.9 8.7
Unemployment Rate 8.0 8.5 8.9 9.0 9.0 9.1 9.0 9.4
8.4 8.5
NAIRU 8.6 8.4 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.9
2.1 2.2
Labour Cost Index 3.4 3.5 2.7 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.7 3.1
1.4 1.1
Labour Productivity 0.3 0.2 0.0 1.4 1.7 2.1 1.9 2.7
1.6 1
HICP 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.6 1.9 2.9




Percentage change in the average level compared with the same period a year earlier, except for unemployment rate 
and NAIRU that are expressed in levels. Labour productivity is measured as a long run concept and refers to 
employment potential. Point forecasts and 80% confidence bounds are taken from the EFN forecasting model and are 





























Comparison with alternative forecasts 
The forecasts presented above were obtained from the EFN 
macroeconometric model, described in detail in the Spring 2002 
report. Table 1.4 shows a comparison of the EFN forecasts for
the main macroeconomic aggregates with other forecasts, 
notably those of the European Commission, the IMF, the ECB, 
the OECD, and Consensus Economics Inc. 
Due to different information sets, the forecast comparison is 
biased. For example, the EFN forecast is based on a dataset 
including the 2nd quarter of 2004, which has been available 
only since September. However, for both years of the 
forecasting horizon, the EFN outlook is slightly more 
pessimistic, in particular regarding the development of gross 
fixed capital  investment. This outlook seems plausible, given 
that investment expanded in the first quarter of 2004 only very 
modestly and that leading indicators point to a slow revival. 
While investment and private consumption  are on a lower path 
than in other forecasts, our outlook for government 
consumption is higher. These issues are related, as government 
has behaved counter-cyclically in the past. Hence, if the outlook 
for domestic demand is more pessimistic, government 
consumption is likely to be stronger. Also, because at present 
the Stability and Growth Pact is de facto in abeyance, its 
restrictions appear to be less binding. 
Our inflation forecasts are slightly higher than those from 
other institutions, possibly because we are given an individual 
treatment to energy prices in the HICP. Our forecasts, like all 
others, suggest a fall in inflation in 2005, but as we explain 
above, this is due to energy and tobacco prices and that for 
















… and estimates 
slightly more 
inflation for 2004 
and 2005 
 
Table 1.4 Comparison of EFN forecast with alternative forecasts 
  EFN EU IMF ECB OECD Consensus
  2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005
GDP 1.8 1.9 1.7 2.3 1.9 2.4 1.7 2.2 2.0 2.6 1.8 2.0 
Private Consumption 1.3 1.8 1.6 2.3 1.3 2.2 1.2 2.0 2.1 2.6 1.3 1.8 
Gov. Consumption 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.4 0.9 0.7 1.1 1.4 1.4 
Fixed Capital Form. 1.0 3.0 2.4 3.6 2.7 3.5 1.8 3.5 3.1 4.4 1.4 3.0 
Unemployment rate 9.0 9.0 8.8 8.6 9.1 8.9 na na 8.8 8.5 9.0 8.8 
HICP 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.7 1.6 2.1 1.7 1.7 1.4 2.1 1.8 
Industrial Production 2.3 2.4 na na na na na na na na 2.1 2.5 
 
EU: European Commission, European Economy, No. 2, 2004 (Spring); IMF: World Economic Outlook, April 2004; 
ECB: ECB Monthly Bulletin, June 2004, OECD: OECD Economic Outlook, No. 75, June 2004; Consensus: Consensus 
Economics Inc., Consensus Forecasts, September 2004. IMF forecasts for demand components refer to the European 
Union. ECB figures correspond to their macroeconomic projections. Numbers in the table refer to the mean of the 
respective projected interval. 
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Important variables indicating the state of the world economy are shown in the table 
below. For the US and Japan, an upswing is expected, in particular for 2004. This is 
reflected in an increase in GDP growth rates, while inflation will remain moderate. At the 
end of 2004, the oil price is forecast at 39 US dollar per barrel, and a weak relaxation is 
expected for 2005. The euro is predicted to depreciate slightly in 2005 against the US dollar 
and the Yen, in line with the international parity conditions. In particular, purchasing power 
parity holds as a long run relationship. 
Table 1.5 Variables of the world economy 
  2004 2005 
US GDP Growth Rate 4.3 3.5 
US Consumer Price Inflation 2.7 2.4 
US Short Term Interest Rate 2.0 3.0 
US Long Term Interest Rate 4.7 5.2 
Japan GDP Growth Rate 4.3 1.8 
Japan Consumer Price Inflation 0.1 0.0 
Japan Short Term Interest Rate 0.1 0.1 
Japan Long Term Interest Rate 1.7 1.8 
World Trade 7.8 8.2 
Oil Price 39 35 
USD/Euro Exchange Rate 1.23 1.19 
100Yen/Euro Exchange Rate 1.29 1.18 
 
Apart from the development of world trade and nominal exchange rates, all variables are exogenous 
to the EFN forecast, and taken from Consensus Economics, Forecasts September 2004. Oil prices, 
interest rates and exchange rates refer to the end of the period. The oil price is in US dollars per 
barrel, all other variables in percent. 
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BOX 1.2: IMPACT OF A RISE IN OIL PRICES ON THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 
 
In this box, a quantitative assessment of the impact of higher oil prices on GDP growth and inflation is 
provided. Since January 2002, oil prices have more than doubled. In August 2004, the oil price has reached 
its all time high in nominal terms at about 43 US dollars per barrel (Brent). The hike is partly caused by 
worries about stability in the Middle East, about a possible disruption of supplies from Russia due to the 
Yukos crisis, and about the political turbulences in Venezuela. In addition, a key determinant for the oil price 
development is the strong growth in demand, driven in particular by the US and China. Both political risks in 
important oil producing countries and growth processes in North America and Asia are likely to last, and  
therefore oil prices will probably stay significantly higher than during the 90s. In the 1970s, two oil crises led 
to significant downturns of economic activity. Thus, the worldwide upswing and the economic recovery in 
the euro area appear to be endangered. 
From a global perspective, the economic costs of higher oil prices are not so obvious because, naturally, a 
higher price not only means higher costs for the buyer, but also higher revenues for the seller. In the long run 
there can be a global loss of output if more resources are allocated to use energy more efficiently. In the short 
run, the world economy has to bear the costs of adapting to an abruptly changing price system. In addition, 
importing regions like the euro area suffer from a deterioration of their terms of trade. Due to higher oil 
prices, disposable incomes of households in importing countries are reduced, and profits of firms are 
squeezed. As a consequence, macroeconomic demand falls. While in the very short term, the price level goes 
up because of higher oil prices, weaker demand soon puts a downward pressure on inflation. Therefore, the 
long term inflation rate will not rise as a consequence of the impact of the oil price hike on the price level. 
Thus, provided that unions do not begin a wage-price spiral by trying to achieve a compensation for the 
decrease of real wage income, restrictive measures in response to an oil price hike are not the appropriate 
monetary reaction. This is specifically true for the ECB because of the fragile situation of the euro area 
economy. 
The actual price jump appears, however, less dramatic, when the change in the overall price level is taken 
into account, see figure 1.7. It shows that real oil prices are 50 percent below their peak in 1980. Moreover, 
the increase in oil prices shown in figure 1.7 is exaggerated for the euro area, as the euro has appreciated 
against the US Dollar by more than 30 percent since 2002. 
 






























































1 As the foreign countries (US, Japan) are endogenously detrmined, the effects are larger than in previous reports 
 
 
Table 1.6: GDP growth and HICP inflation effects of an increase of the oil price to 50 USD per barrel 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2004-2008 
GDP growth -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.8 
HICP 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.7 
 
       Differences to baseline in percentage points. Results based on the EFN macroeconometric model for the euro area. 
 
Apparently, higher oil prices exert negative impacts on the macroeconomic evolution. While the 
contemporaneous effects appear to be negligible, GDP growth (inflation) is 0.3 percentage points below 
(above) the baseline in the year after the shock. The losses in real GDP growth cumulate to almost 1 
percentage point over a 5-year horizon1. The magnitude of these effects is broadly in line with those 
reported in a number of other recent studies, including Global Insight (2004), Oxford Economic Forecasting 
(2000), and International Energy Agency (2004). 
Although the effects appear to be quite substantial, they seem to be lower when compared to the past 
experience. According to the Deutsche Bundesbank, each of the two oil crises in the 1970s led to cumulative 
losses in German output growth in the range of 4 percentage points. One reason for the smaller effect of an 
oil price hike today may be that due to the liberalization of international capital markets,  the windfall profits 
of oil producing countries can be transferred more easily to consumption and investment spending, whereas 
in the 1970s, the so-called recycling of the petrodollars turned out to be a serious problem, caused by the 
change in the income distribution between oil producers and oil importers. Moreover, the industrialized 
countries have become more efficient in their use of energy, and the abilities of end-users to switch away 
from oil have increased markedly. As a consequence of these developments, the amount of oil needed to 
produce one unit of GDP roughly halved since the 1970s. 
Generally, the vulnerability of oil importing countries to higher oil prices depends on their energy intensity 
of production, which is larger in developing countries. For example, oil consumption per unit of real GDP 
exceeds the OECD average by a factor of 2 in China and 3 in India. Consequently, the adverse impacts on  
macroeconomic performance are probably twice as large as in their developed world, see International 
Energy Agency (2004). 
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BOX 1.3: AN EVALUATION OF LEADING INDICATOR FORECASTS 
 
Since the pioneering work of Mitchell and Burns (1938) and Burns and Mitchell (1946), leading indicators 
have attracted considerable attention, in particular from politicians and business people, who consider them 
as a useful tool for predicting future economic conditions. Economists and econometricians had developed 
more mixed feelings towards the leading indicators, starting with Koopmans's (1947) critique of the work of 
Burns and Mitchell, considered as an exercise in "measurement without theory". The resulting debate has 
stimulated the production of a vast literature that deals with the different aspects of the leading indicators, 
ranging from the choice and evaluation of the best indicators, possibly combined in composite indexes, to the 
development of more and more sophisticated methods to relate them to the target variable. Marcellino (2004) 
provides a summary updated guide for the construction, use and evaluation of leading indicators and, more 
important, an assessment of the most relevant recent developments in this field of economic forecasting. 
In this box we summarize the performance of leading indicator based forecasts for the latest recession in the 
US, dated from March to November 2001 by the NBER. It is interesting to mention that the CEPR dating 
committee did not spot a similar event for the euro area, in line with the findings based on formal analysis by 
Artis, Marcellino and Proietti (2003). Yet, these authors pointed out that if the focus is on the deviation cycle 
rather than on the classical cycle, then a trough in 2001 is identified also for the euro area. 
Filardo (2002) found that the two-month negative growth rule applied to the Conference Board’s Composite 
Leading Indicator, CLICB, worked well in predicting the 2001 US recession, but sent out several false alarms 
in the '90s. A probit model with a 3-month forecast horizon and the term spread, corporate spread, S&P500 
returns and the CLICB as regressors also worked well, predicting the beginning of the recession in January 
2001 using a 50% rule (namely, indicating a recession when the predicted probability is higher than 0.50). 
By contrast, Stock and Watson’s (1989) Composite Recession Indicator (CRI) did not perform well. 
Stock and Watson (2003) analyzed in detail the reasons for the poor performance of their indicator, 
concluding that it was mostly due to the particular origin of the recession (coming from the decline in stock 
prices and business investment), which is not properly reflected by most of the indicators in their CRI. In 
particular, the best indicators for the GDP growth rate were the term spread, the short term interest rate, the 
junk bond spread, stock prices, and new claims for unemployment. Notice that most of these variables are 
included in Filardo's (2002) probit models. Moreover, they found that pooled forecasts worked well, but less 
well than some single indicators in the list reported above. 
Dueker (2003) found that his Qual-VAR model, a combination of a binary model and a linear VAR 
estimated with Bayesian techniques, predicted the timing of the 2001 recession quite well relative to  
professional forecasters, while the evidence in Dueker and Welshe (2001) is more mixed. Dueker (2002) 
noticed that a Markov Switching probit model with the CLICB as regressor also worked  rather well in this 
occasion, providing a 6-month warning of the beginning of the recession (but not in the case of the previous 
recession). 
Overall, there are differences in the ranking of models and usefulness of the leading indicators because of the 
choice of the specific coincident and leading variables, sample period, criteria of evaluation, etc. Yet, a few 
findings are rather robust. First, indicator selection and combination methods are important, and there is 
hardly a “one size fits all” choice, even though financial variables and the equal weighted CLICB seem to 
have a good average forecasting performance. Second, the model that relates coincident and leading 
indicators also matters, and a Markov Switching feature is typically helpful. Finally, in general, pooling the 
forecasts produces good results, even though there is only a limited evidence as far as turning point 
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Conjunctural analysis for the New Member States
While the combined economic weight of the ten New Members 
might seem relatively small compared to the EU-15, the 
dynamics of growth, commitment to internal reforms, and 
desire to close the income gap with the rest of the EU may well 
provide a key impulse to future economic development in 
Europe.  Even before their accession, most of the key 
economies in the region were recording improved 
performances, with GDP growth accelerating in the first quarter 
of 2004.  Average annual GDP growth in the region is bound to 
recover from a preliminary 4.5% in 2003. According to our 
latest forecasts, GDP growth will jump to 5.2% this year, driven 
by strong performances in Poland and Slovakia, recoveries in 
growth in the Czech Republic and Hungary and the continued 
boom in the Baltics, see table 2.1. Our projections for 2004 may 
well be pushed upward even further based on the very positive 
results that were recorded in the first six months of the year. 
Our growth forecast for 2004 and beyond is somewhat more 
optimistic than in our last report. Growth has surprised us on 
the upside in the first half of 2004, mostly in the case of the 
economies that have relied on net exports as the key driver of 
growth in the last several quarters. The delayed rebound in 
investment spending has not precluded Poland and Slovakia 
from recording solid expansion, based predominantly on 
identifying and exploiting existing niches in West European 
markets despite the still lacklustre growth in demand for 
imports there. When supported by an anticipated boom in 
investment spending that should be at least partially supported 
by funding from the EU's regional and cohesion funds, the 
outlook for growth for all of the New Member States is very 
buoyant with annual rates in the 4-4.5% range in the coming 
years.  
The delayed effects on prices of food products of drought 
conditions across the continent in the summer of 2003 
continued to influence inflationary pressures in early 2004. In 
addition, and far more importantly, world market crude oil 
prices edged up to levels considered very high even by 
historical standards. Many of the New Member States also 
embarked on a major process of adjustments in VAT and excise 
tax rates in order to harmonize their tax regimes with EU 
requirements. Finally, the EU accession itself resulted in a 
short-lived surge in prices for selected products, mostly food. 
All these factors together led to a modest acceleration of 
inflation in all of the New Member States.  Despite these recent
developments, the risk of a major resurgence in inflation in the 
New Member States is not significant in the short- to medium-
term future. Despite the persistently high cost of oil in 
international markets, the inflationary pressures in the global 
economy remain subdued. The period of extraordinarily low 
GDP growth will 
jump to at least 
5.2% in 2004 and 
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interest rates is clearly coming to an end.  The same applies to 
most of the economies of the New Member States.  Overall 
inflation rates are likely to peak sometime later this year and 
start declining again in 2005 and beyond. In most cases, 
inflationary performance is not likely to constitute an obstacle 
in the New Member States’ quest for future membership in the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).  
For the New Member States, entry into the European Union is 
considered only a stepping stone towards further economic 
integration that would culminate in the adoption of the euro 
and full membership in the EMU. The obvious advantages of 
entering the EMU are viewed as outweighing the challenges 
along the way. Among these challenges, achieving the nominal 
convergence of key economic indicators with those of the other 
countries in the euro area is still a distant prospect for many 
countries, although it should be noted that the criteria with 
respect to fiscal deficits and public debt were applied flexibly 
in the case of the existing members of the EMU. While the 
smaller New Member States, such as the Baltics, Slovenia, 
Cyprus and Malta can conceivably adopt the euro as early as in 
2007-2008, the four largest, Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Slovakia, have their work cut out for them for the 
next several years, with the prospect of adopting the euro now 
being pushed back as far as to 2010. Continued problems in 
containing fiscal deficits are at the core of this challenge. The 
current fiscal ills in the region are not going to disappear in the 
short-to-medium term unless growth reaches 4-5% annually 
across the region and budget spending is seriously curtailed. 
Furthermore, transfers from the EU will require the governments 
to allocate amounts of matching funds within the budget, putting 
an additional strain on public finances.  For these economies, 
the chances of bringing public sector deficits below 3% of 
GDP any time soon are becoming increasingly remote.  
Although the sources of the underlying problems (structural 
fiscal rigidities relating to bloated and inefficient social 
security systems and bureaucratic waste) are well known to 
them, these governments find it quite difficult to tackle the 
problems they are facing. In our Spring 2004 report, we 
indicated that the fiscal situation across the region was not very 
rosy. Unfortunately, the situation has not improved much in the 
interim, see table 2.2. An exception is the Slovak center-right 
government that took the office in September 2002. It has put 
forward wide-ranging reforms in the area of taxes, pensions, 
health care and social policy, aimed at bringing down the 
public finance deficit, while at the same time simplifying the 
taxation system, preventing tax evasion and promoting 
investment. As a result of the reform, Slovakia is likely to be 
the first of the big four New Member State economies to adopt 
the euro in 2008-2009.  
Fiscal challenges will also make interest rate convergence more 
difficult. Having switched to a more cautious approach to
interest rate reductions during 2003, the monetary authorities in
most of the New Member States set a steady course late last 
year and early this year by keeping rate adjustments to an 
absolute minimum. While there is arguably still room for 
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Slovakia and Hungary, the authorities could not ignore the first 
signs of gathering inflationary pressures and the fact that the 
region’s economies are either recording robust growth or 
signaling that a recovery from the lacklustre performance of the 
last two years is well underway. Countries that have 
successfully applied inflation targeting are watching price 
developments with moderate concern and trying to estimate the 
destabilizing monetary impact of increased credit activity or 
weakness in the local currencies.  
In all New Member Countries, the authorities are attempting to 
maintain balance between the expectation of nominal 
convergence in inflation, exchange rates, and long-term interest 
rates to EU levels, with the need to counteract excessive market 
volatility due to external shocks, the unstable situation in 
public finances, and the influence of the opening of local 
capital markets on currency stability. In all of these cases, a 
moderate tightening of monetary conditions would have a 















 Real GDP Growth in %         Avg. CPI Inflation in % 
              
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2001 2002 2003  2004  2005 
Cyprus 4.0 2.0  2.0 3.5 3.3 2.0 2.8 4.1  2.0  2.2 
Czech 
Republic 
2.6 1.5  3.1 3.6 4.0 2.0 2.8 4.1  2.0  2.2 
Estonia 6.4 7.2  4.9 6.4 5.9 5.8 3.6 1.3  2.3  3.4 
Latvia 8.0 6.4  7.5 7.4 6.3 2.5 1.9 2.9  4.7  3.5 
Lithuania 6.4 6.8  9.0 6.6 5.3 1.5 0.3 -1.2  0.9  1.1 
Hungary 3.8 3.5  2.9 3.6 3.7 9.2 5.3 4.7  6.9  4.6 
Malta 2.3 -1.7  3.4 3.3 3.2 2.9 2.2 1.3  2.6  2.3 
Poland 1.0 1.4  3.7 6.0 5.4 5.5 1.9 0.7  3.6  3.2 
Slovakia 3.8 4.4  4.2 4.6 5.0 7.3 3.3 8.5  7.6  3.8 
Slovenia 2.9 3.2  2.3 3.5 3.7 8.4 7.5 5.6  3.9  3.5 
           
Table 2.2 
   Unemployment rate    Public Sector Deficit 
 in % of labor force in % of GDP 
 2001 2002  2003 2004 2005 2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  
Cyprus 3.3 3.3  3.3 3.3 3.3 -2.8 -3.6 -5.9  -3.6  -3.1 
Czech 
Republic 
8.5 9.2  9.9 10.3 10.1 -6.5 -6.4 -13.0  -5.4  -4.7 
Estonia 12.6 10.3  10.0 9.5 9.3 0.3 1.8 2.6  1.2  0.3 
Latvia 7.7 8.5  8.6 9.2 9.0 -1.6 -2.7 -1.8  -1.7  -1.8 
Lithuania 12.5 13.8  12.4 11.8 11.2 -2.1 -1.4 -1.7  -1.3  -0.8 
Hungary 5.7 5.8  5.9 5.9 5.8 -4.4 -9.3 -5.9  -5.1  -4.2 
Malta 5.2 5.6  5.3 5.1 5.1 -6.4 -5.7 -9.7  -5.5  -4.5 
Poland 19.4 20.0  20.0 19.2 18.5 -4.8 -5.5 -5.3  -5.7  -4.9 
Slovakia 18.3 17.8  15.2 14.6 14.0 -6.0 -5.7 -3.5  -3.8  -4.1 









In the 2000 Lisbon Council the heads of European Union 
countries stated as their goal the establishment of “the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 
world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and 
better jobs and greater social cohesion” by 2010. To achieve 
this, it was intended that an array of economic and structural 
reforms called the Lisbon Strategy would be implemented.  At 
the time the macroeconomic backdrop to the proposals were 
particularly propitious; with hindsight it is apparent that the 
world economy was at a cyclical peak. After four years of poor 
economic performance the euro area is now recovering on the 
back of a strong revival in the US and Asia.  However, the 
coordination of fiscal policy through the mechanism of the 
Stability and Growth Pact is in tatters and 6 countries have 
deficits in excess of 3 % of output. 
Setting a date of 2010 by which time the necessary supply side 
changes had been implemented and given an opportunity to 
boost productive capacity was always very optimistic. 
However, in political terms a date that fell within the normal 
political horizon, was more likely to infuse the reform process 
with a sense of urgency. Subsequently, in many cases the 
cyclical slowdown since 2000 and rising unemployment has 
dented any enthusiasm for major change and the supply side 
reforms – particularly in the large countries of continental 
Europe – have failed to materialise. 
Some perspective on the Lisbon process can be gained from an 
inspection of developments since the inception of the single 
market process at the beginning of the 1990s. Reviews of the 
progress made by the Strategy have been made on a regular 
basis. An annual assessment by the European Commission 
considers fourteen structural indicators within all seven main 
areas of the Strategy. These are based on officially published 
statistics. The conclusions of the most recent study is that 
performance is mixed: Denmark, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have 
achieved relatively better progress in achieving the Strategy’s 
goals, while Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal have performed 
relatively poorly. 
The question remains whether the better performers would 
have achieved the same thing even if the Strategy had not been 
adopted. To answer this we consider data on structural
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Table 3.1 – Total Employment in the EU countries. 
 1992 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Belgium 56.3 56.1 57.4 59.3 60.5 59.9 59.9 59.6 
Denmark 73.3 73.4 75.1 76 76.3 76.2 75.9 75.1 
Germany 66.4 64.6 63.9 65.2 65.6 65.8 65.4 64.8 
Greece 53.7 54.7 55.5 55.3 55.7 55.4 56.7 57.9 
Spain 49 46.9 51.2 63.7 56.2 57.7 58.4 59.7 
France 59.9 59.5 60.2 60.9 62.1 62.8 62.8 62.8 
Ireland 51.1 54.4 60.6 63.3 65.2 65.8 65.6 65.4 
Italy  51 52 52.7 53.7 54.8 55.5 56.1 
Luxembourg 61.4 58.7 60.5 61.7 62.7 63.1 63.1 61 
Netherlands 64 64.7 70.2 71.7 72.9 74.1 74.7 73.5 
Austria  68.8 67.9 68.6 68.5 68.5 69.2 69.2 
Portugal 66 63.5 66.9 67.5 68.4 68.7 68.2 67.2 
Finland 65.1 61.6 64.6 66.4 67.2 68.1 68.1 67.7 
Sweden 75.9 70.9 70.3 71.7 73 74 73.6 72.9 
United Kingdom 67.9 68.5 70.5 71 71.5 71.7 71.7 71.8 
Norway   76.3 76.2 76.1 75.8 75.4 74 
EU15 average 61.2 60.1 61.4 62.5 63.4 64.1 64.3 64.4 
Note: Data for all tables is taken from Eurostat 
Table 3.2 – Total Employment Rate of Older workers in the EU countries. 
 1992 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Belgium 22.2 22.9 22.9 24.6 26.3 25.1 26.6 28.1 
Denmark 53 49.8 52 54.5 55.7 58 57.9 60.2 
Germany 36.2 37.7 37.7 37.8 37.6 37.9 38.7 39.3 
Greece 39.8 41 39 39.1 38.6 38 39.7 42.3 
Spain 36 32.3 35.1 35 37 39.2 39.7 40.8 
France 29.8 29.6 28.3 28.8 29.9 31.9 34.7 36.8 
Ireland 37.9 39.2 41.7 43.7 45.2 46.5 47.1 49 
Italy  28.4 27.7 27.6 27.7 28 28.9 30.3 
Luxembourg 24.9 23.7 25.1 26.4 26.7 25.6 29.5 38.4 
Netherlands 28.7 28.9 33.9 36.4 38.2 39.6 42.3 44.8 
Austria  29.7 28.4 29.7 28.8 28.9 29.7 30.4 
Portugal 47.8 45.8 50 50.3 50.7 50.1 50.9 51.1 
Finland 37 34.4 36.2 39 41.6 45.7 47.8 49.6 
Sweden 67.3 62 63 63.9 64.9 66.7 68 68.6 
United Kingdom 47.6 47.5 49 49.6 50.8 52.3 53.5 55.5 
Norway   64.5 64.5 65.4 56.9 66.2 66.9 
EU15 36.3 36 36.6 37.1 37.8 38.8 40.1 41.7 
Table 3.3 – Total R&D Expenditure as percentage of GDP in the EU countries. 
 1992 1993 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Belgium  1.71 1.64 1.91 1.96 2.04 2.17  
Denmark 1.68 1.74 1.84 2.06 2.1 2.27 2.4  
Germany 2.48 2.31 2.15 2.33 2.44 2.49 2.51 2.51 
Greece  0.37 0.43  0.65  0.64  
Spain 0.7 0.79 0.79 0.9 0.88 0.94 0.95  
France 2.48 2.43 2.3 2.18 2.18 2.18 2.23 2.2 
Ireland 1 1.19 1.39 1.25 1.2 1.15 1.17  
Italy 0.98 1.07 1.1 1.07 1.04 1.07 1.11  
Luxembourg      1.71   
Netherlands 1.97 1.91 1.89 1.95 2.02 1.9 1.89  
Austria 1.5 1.45 1.49 1.8 1.86 1.84 1.9 1.93 
Portugal 0.53  0.56  0.75  0.85  
Finland 2.08 2.45 2.19 2.9 3.23 3.4 3.41 3.49 
Sweden   2.99 3.35 3.62 3.65  4.27  
United Kingdom 2.08 2.11 1.97 1.81 1.84 1.84 1.89 1.84 
Norway  1.72 1.7  1.65  1.6  
EU15 1.92 1.94 1.89 1.88 1.92 1.95 1.98 1.99 
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What success has been achieved in hitting the Lisbon targets? 
In order to increase EU competitiveness and enhance free trade, 
the Lisbon strategy argues for a decrease in state aid for non-
competitive enterprises and industries. Looking at data for 
sectoral and ad hoc state aid as a percentage of GDP in the EU 
from 1990 to 2001, a clear trend emerges: aid has decreased from 
1.18% of GDP in 1990 to 0.75% in 2001 with the main change 
happening after 1997. However, Belgium, Luxembourg, and 
Finland provide more than 1% of GDP as state aid for ailing 
sectors and companies and should rethink their policies towards 
enterprises in trouble. There was also a significant change in the 
public procurement in this period: its share in GDP has increased 
from 0.97% in 1993 to 2.67% in 2002. Therefore, in accord with 
the Lisbon Strategy, governments of the EU countries have made 





































The Lisbon strategy emphasises that economic growth should be 
accompanied by improvements in the environment: governments 
should make efforts to reduce the energy intensity of industries, 
decrease the volume of waste produced by companies and 
population, and bring greenhouse gas emissions to the levels of 
the Kyoto protocol. Based on the emission of greenhouse gas, the 
EU countries have made more progress to satisfy their targets 
than the USA: the EU needs to decrease  emissions from 98% in 
2001 to 92% of the 1990-level in 2010; while in the USA the 
emission of gas has increased from 1990 to 2001 by 14%. Thus, 
the EU performs better with respect to sustainable development 
than the USA. 
There has been relatively good performance in the development 
of a single market for telecommunications and utilities. The price 
of phone calls and of electricity prices are converging across 
countries. However, since phone calls’ rates are still higher that in 
the USA, the governments need to implement additional reforms 
to reduce barriers. Unfortunately, the EU countries have not made 
such progress in the development of an information society: 
internet penetration is much smaller than in the USA. Another 
reason for lower economic growth in the EU in comparison with 
the USA is the fragmentation of European financial markets. 
Although the Financial Services Actions Plan was adopted, it 
needs to be implemented more effectively to improve conditions 
to conduct business in the EU area. 
Therefore, the performance of EU countries in market 
liberalization and the creation of a single market is mixed. In 
comparison to the USA, among the key disadvantages of the EU 
is that in the European market it takes longer to process and
disseminate information because of lower internet penetration. 
The Lisbon targets for developing a single market can be 
achieved only if governments make provisions to deepen the 
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What would have happened if the Lisbon Strategy had not been 
adopted? 
Two main objectives of the Lisbon strategy are to achieve long-
term real economic growth rate of 3% and to have average 
employment rate of 70% by 2010. Despite a cyclical downturn, 
the total employment rate, has increased from 63.4% in 2000 to 
64.3% in 2003 in the EU countries. However, this is still well 
short of the intermediate target of 67% in 2005. Moreover, 
performance varies considerably across countries: from 56.1% 
in Italy to 75.1% in Denmark (Table 3.1).  
Countries with employment rates in excess of or close to 70% 
in 1992 have remained the best performers in 2003, while in the 
countries with the lowest employment rates in 1992, total 
employment  has hardly changed and in Germany and Belgium 
employment rates have decreased since 2000. Only Spain and 
Netherlands, who implemented structural reforms of labour 
markets, have experienced an increase of more than 10 
percentage points in people employed. These figures suggest 
that the adoption of Lisbon Strategy has led to no significant
improvements in this particular labour market indicator. This 
emphasizes the need for urgent reforms in labour markets if the 
Lisbon target to be fulfilled. 
Another way of creating new jobs is through the development 
of new products and industries. The Lisbon Strategy postulates 
a target for research and development (R&D) expenditures to 
be 3% of GDP by 2010. In 2002, average R&D expenditures 
were only 1.99% of  EU GDP. This is much smaller than the 
2.64% in the USA and 3.07% in Japan. Among the EU 
countries the range of R&D expenditures is also very wide with 
the highest level observed in Germany, France, Finland and 
Sweden. These countries have traditionally strong high 
technological and pharmaceutical industries which require a lot 
of research. Similar to the previous two indicators, there are no 
significant improvements in the expenditures since 1992. This 
points out that more reforms are necessary to achieve the 
Lisbon target. 
An important factor of production is human capital. Since 
labour productivity in the EU is smaller than in the USA, the 
quality of the labour force can be a major factor in GDP 
growth. Recognizing this, the Lisbon strategy sets a (maximum) 
10% target for the rate of early school leavers. The worst 
performers based on this measure are the South European 
countries in which around a quarter of young people leave 
school education, while quite a few countries are already close 
to the target. Therefore, more efforts should be made in Spain, 
Italy, and especially, Portugal to achieve the Lisbon target. 
There are no pronounced changes in the levels of this indicator 
in the period from 1992 to 2003. Only in Luxembourg has 
dramatic change occurred: the rate of school drop-outs has 
decreased from 42.2% in 1992 to 17% in 2003 due to massive 
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These indicators for human capital and innovation show that the 
adoption of the Lisbon strategies has not led to dramatic 
changes. In the total number of people employed and R&D 
expenditures, the tendency to increase has been observed from 
1992, while the number of early school leavers has decreased in 
the same period. Thus, the Lisbon strategy should not break this 
trend and should focus on the countries, which under-perform 
such as the Southern European countries. 
In addition to the official data, the Growth Competitiveness and 
Business competitiveness indicators from the Global 
Competitiveness Reports show that the adoption of the Lisbon 
Strategy has not influenced the euro area’s attraction for 
business. These indicators are constructed based on the official 
statistics and replies to the global survey of business leaders. 
Based on replies, countries are ranked by their ability to provide 
favourable conditions for business. The rankings for 1996 to 
2003 shows that there were no significant changes in countries’ 
competitiveness in this period: Scandinavian countries have had 
highest ranking among the EU countries in this period, while 
Greece has had the lowest. It would seem that the perceptions 
of business leaders of European economies have not been 
affected by the adoption of Lisbon Strategy. 
Finally, the 
adoption of the 
Lisbon Strategy 
has not influenced 




In 2000, the Lisbon European Council decided to launch a ten 
year-strategy focused in reaching a leadership economic 
position in dynamic and competitive terms. The 
implementation of these policies would result in sustainable 
and non-inflationary growth with lower unemployment rates 
and more sustainability of public finances. 
In order to achieve these objectives, the European Union (EU) 
has established in different European Councils (Lisbon, 2000; 
Stockholm, 2001; Gothenburg, 2001; Barcelona, 2002; 
Brussels, 2003) several objectives, grouped in five dimensions 
- Employment (A), Innovation and research (B), Structural 
economic reforms (C), Social cohesion, (D) and Environment 
(E) - and quantified by a set of comparable structural 
indicators, with a ten year temporal threshold of policy ciphers 
that allows policy makers to evaluate the evolution of the 
overall strategy. Roughly speaking, all generic objectives have 
a list of specific objectives that ensure the completion of the 
initial concept that faces the strategy. These specific objectives 
are: More and better jobs for Europe: developing an active 
employment policy (A.1); Information society for all (B.2);
Establishing a European Area of Research and Innovation 
(B.3); Education and training for living and working in the 
knowledge society (B.4); Creating a friendly environment for 
starting up and developing innovative businesses, especially 
SMEs (C.5);  Economic reforms for a complete and fully 
operational internal market (C.6); Efficient and integrated 
financial markets (C.7); Coordinating macro-economic 
policies: fiscal consolidation, quality and sustainability of 
public finances (C.8); Modernising social protection (D.9);
Promoting social inclusion (D.10); and,  A strategy for 
sustainable development (E.11).  
At the Lisbon Special European Council held in March 2000, a 
need was identified to regularly discuss and assess progress 
made in achieving the strategic goal for the next decade of 
“becoming the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-
based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic 
growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion”. 
The Council invited the Commission to draft an annual 
synthesis report (Spring Report) on progress towards this goal, 
on the basis of commonly agreed structural indicators which 
would ensure necessary coherence and standard presentation. 
In order to meet the request of the European Council, since 
2000 the Commission presents annually, at the end of the year, 
a communication named “Structural Indicators” with a set of
indicators to be used in the synthesis report for the respective 
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Although the list of indicators developed by the Commission 
involves more than a hundred indicators, the Commission has 
reduced this list to only 14 Structural Indicators in the 2004 
Report.  The indicators are related to the five main areas of the 
Lisbon Strategy (Employment, Innovation and Research, 
Economic Reform, Social Cohesion, Environment) and to the 
General Economic Background. In Figure 4.1 we present a 
chart with the whole set of indicators (Structural and 
Complementary Indicators). In bold you will find the indicators 
that are included in the list of 14 indicators.  
Implementation, albeit partially, of the reforms under the 
Lisbon Strategy has started to bear some fruit as regards the 
initial objectives. As the Commission says in the last report to 
the European Council (COM-2004, 29 final), the overall 
progress already made in four years is proof of this: i) More 
than six million jobs have been created since 1999, and the 
long-term unemployment has dropped sharply; ii) Several key 
markets have been completely or partially opened up to 
competition; iii) The knowledge-based economy is becoming a 
reality, with strong Internet take-up in schools, businesses, 
public administration and households, and thanks to the gradual 
development of the European Research Area; iv) The 
sustainable development approach is being taken more fully 
into account in policymaking; and, v) Some one hundred 
regulations, directives and programmes have been adopted in 
different fields but all pursuing the Lisbon goals. 
An analysis of the progress made highlights the relatively 
positive developments but also the major problems which need 
to be tackled urgently: i) The need for public finances to be 
viable; ii) The unsatisfactory contribution of employment and 
productivity to growth; iii) The disappointing development of 
the internal market; and, iv) Absence of sustainable growth.  
Moreover, labour participation remains low and unemployment 
high, while competition in many markets, such as services is 
still low. These problems are particularly severe in the largest 
countries of the euro area. In sum, the revision of the Lisbon 
Agenda shows a slow progress in most of the areas under 
consideration, much slower than desired. After analysing the 
position in a ranking for each country of each structural 
indicator in the last year available, we have observed that, 
briefly, in 2001 there are three countries, namely Denmark, 
Netherlands and Sweden, which present good positions in a 
majority of indicators. In contrast, we find in 2001 Greece, 
Spain, Italy and Portugal with relatively bad positions for most 
of the indicators. Taking into consideration the relative changes 
of every country position between 1995 and 2001, we see how 
Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, Finland and Sweden have 
experienced an improvement of their positions in the structural 
indicators rankings, while France, Germany, Italy and Austria 
have worsened in relative during the six years considered. 
The information given by the Commission on the state of the 
play of the different countries and the EU as a whole in order to 
evaluate the objectives of the Lisbon Strategy is merely based 
















































































However, in our belief, a deeper analysis consisting of the 
implications that the evolution of these indicators may have on 
economic growth could provide a richer explanation on the role 

























Although we can assume that the list of indicators is the result 
of intensive investigation, we also consider the need to revise
the overall indicators strategy by computing a set of basic 
statistics. Thus, we have computed the cross and serial 
correlations of structural indicators with the general economic 
background indicators, which are thus to be considered a 
summary of the overall objective of the Lisbon Strategy, 
namely, to become a global economic leader. Additionally, we 
are interested in knowing whether general growth of the 
economies has been accompanied by a similar growth on 
employment, knowledge and human capital, investments or 
social cohesion among others. In order to do this, and focusing 
exclusively on growth of GDP per capita, we have also 
computed the correlation between this variable and the 
evolution of the structural indicators. All of these correlations 
were computed taking into account the relative size of every 
country. Detailed results are shown in the annex to this chapter, 
which is available on the EFN website (www.efn.uni-
bocconi.it). 
Following this analysis we can conclude that, in general terms, 
GDP per capita growth of EU15 countries during the nineties 
has been positively correlated with growth in terms of human 
capital and, especially, employment (total and for older 
workers) and business investments; that is, factors that reveal 
themselves as solid forces of economic growth.  In addition, 
this growth has not implied a worsening in social cohesion, at 
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Note: These figures show the position in a ranking for each country of each structural indicator in the last year 
available. This way, the length of the bar for one indicator shows the position of this country in the ranking of this 
indicator. If the bar is the longest it can be, it would imply that this country keeps the best position in this indicator, and 
with no bar (just in the central point) the country would present the worst position. An additional indicator has been 
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the contrary, this growth in GDP per capita has been 
accompanied by relative growth in prices, and it seems hardly
sustainable since it has lead to a general increase in the 
greenhouse gases emissions (with the negative consequences in 
terms of potential impact on climate change) and in the general 
degree of congestion and pollution (as a consequence of rising 
volumes of traffic and a certain decoupling of freight transport 
growth from real GDP growth). 
Finally, it should be noted that some countries that grew more 
in terms of GDP per capita during the last ten years showed, at 
the beginning of the period, relatively low employment rates 
(Spain, Ireland and Greece), low levels of expenditures on 
R&D (Greece, Spain, Portugal or Ireland), youth educational 
attainment levels (Portugal, Luxemburg and Spain) and 
business investments (Ireland, Greece or Finland) or high levels 
of long-term unemployment levels (Ireland or Spain), reflecting 
a clear catch up process. 
The analysis we have conducted can be complemented with a 
discussion of the implications that the evolution of these 
indicators may have on economic growth. Since the economic 
literature considers the innovation and research process as one 
of the most important growth factors, as a first stage, we 
compute several correlation measures to analyze the link 
between economic growth and the level and growth of the 
innovation and research indicators. Many of these correlations 
are low while we expected higher values. Increases in patents, 
both in the European and US cases, in youth education 
attainment level and in science and technology graduates have 
run parallel to growth rates over the whole period. This positive 
relation is observed for the increases in the indicator but not for 
the level, which would indicate that the important issue is the 
effort made in patenting and getting higher education levels 
more than the initial level. Increases in spending on human 
resources seem however not positively correlated with output 
growth rates, if anything the opposite is observable. Finally, for 
the cases of evolution of both gross domestic expenditure on 
R&D and venture capital no relationship is observed.  
We estimate a growth equation for the sample of 15 countries 
of the EU for which we can get information for the whole 
period between 1994 and 2003. In order to avoid 
heteroskedasticity problems the estimation method is weighted 








that includes a random error term which proxies the transitory 
shocks, where gGDP is relative growth of GDP between periods 
0 and T, the variable Service is the share of value added in 
service sectors as a proxy of the sectorial structure of the
economy and gI&R is the growth rate of each one of the 
indicators in the area of “Innovation and Research” of the 
Lisbon Strategy. The subscript i denotes the country, T is the 
final year under consideration and 0 the initial one. The growth 
rate of GDP is obtained for the period 1994-2003, whereas the 
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for the period 1994-2001.The results are depicted in Table 4.1. 
Thus, as may be observed in column 1, absolute convergence is 
shown, given the negative value of the level of GDP in the initial 
year. Only three indicators present significant parameters in the 
growth equation. Increases in “Spending on human resources” 
(column 2) seem to affect negatively and significantly GDP 
growth rates, whereas “Patents in the European Patent Office” 
(column 5) as well as “Youth educational attainment level” 
(column 9) present a positive effect on economic growth rate. The 
indicators for innovation (Gross domestic expenditure in R&D, 
Science and technology graduates and Venture capital 
investments) are not significant. 
Also, the convergence process which was observed before 
introducing the innovation indicators is not maintained in the 
three cases in which these indicators are significant. This fact 
points to the ideas expressed by endogenous growth models in 
which decreasing returns seem not to operate, probably due to 
technological growth which will not be putting general limits on
growth. As a consequence convergence is not observed in general 
terms.  
Concerning the possibility of building composite indicators on the 
knowledge-based economy, as stated in the Communication from 
the Commission COM-2003 585, we have followed a double 
strategy for reducing the multidimensionality. Firstly, we 
considered a set of composite measurements based on principal 
components analysis, which minimizes the loss of common 
information. Secondly, we use a structural index methodology, as 
in Royuela, Suriñach and Reyes (2003), which tries to pick up all 
the information belonging to the variables considered, while the 
other methodology considers, generally speaking, the information 
common to all variables. This second alternative can be 
considered more appropriate than the first, in order to assume a 
multidimensional framework: if there are several dimensions of 
innovation and research that are not statistically correlated, the 
principal components approach could not lead to any reasonable 
solution, while the second approach can be perfectly reasonable. 
After choosing the list of final variables, we have computed the 
principal component analysis. The two first principal components 
explain 64% of the total variance of the 13 indicators. 
The second strategy computes indices of two composite 
measurements of innovation and research, and considered the ad 
hoc separation of the indicators. The selection of the final 
structure was made after the inspection of the former correlations 
between structural indicators and the global list of Innovation and 
Research indicators. These correlations led us to grouping
Education indicators against Innovation indicators, following, 
indeed, the Commission selection of the two structural indicators: 
GERD (say, Innovation) and Youth Education Attainment Level 
(say, Education).  
Thus, we finally considered on the one side Education indicators: 
Science and technology graduates and Youth education 
attainment level; while for the other vector we have the 






















Table 4.1. Estimation of the growth equation against I&R indicators 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
 
  Spending GERD Science and 
technology 
graduates 












4.530*** -1.289 3.891*** -1.187 -1.867*** -2.727*** 3.364*** 3.517*** -1.817** Constant 
(0.579) (0.946) (0.648) (0.729) (0.577) (0.606) (0.621) (0.627) (0.593) 
-0.484*** 0.249* -0.372*** 0.277*** 0.273*** 0.461*** -0.354*** -0.364*** 0.339*** Ln GDP0 
(0.582) (0.122) (0.053) (0.082) (0.086) (0.672) (0.059) (0.059) (0.071) 
0.748*** -1.149** 0.48 -1.707*** -0.848** -2.001*** 0.569* 0.487 -1.707*** Service 
(0.245) (0.387) (0.457) (0.170) (0.383) (0.222) (0.281) (0.270) (0.175) 
-0.310* -0.118 -0.045 0.125** -0.053 -0.000 -0.001 0.244***  I&R 
Indicator 
  
(0.162) (0.101) (0.025) (0.041) (0.0.043) (0.001) (0.004) (0.076) 
R2 0.860 0.938 0.838 0.969 0.899 0.896 0.830 0.828 0.942 
Loglikelihood  20.769 25.322 24.888 22.979 26.925 23.273 23.017 22.939 25.537 
Note: Endogenous variable: growth rate of GDP. Standard errors in brackets.     







domestic expenditure on R&D, Patents EPO and Patents USPTO, and 
Venture capital investments. Taking all these results into 
consideration we have computed again the convergence equation, 
against growth of Innovation and Research indicators, but now being 
computed as composite measurements. What we finally find is a 
positive influence of both Education and Innovation on GDP per 
capita growth, although no overall convergence process is found. 
 
In summary, from a policy point of view the annual reports of the 
Commission that only review the evolution of the different indicators
could be complemented with a discussion of the implications that the 
evolution of these indicators may have for economic growth, along 
the lines followed in this chapter. 
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Diffusion of IT Access to finances (in 
particular for start-ups) 
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Quality of work 
- Employment rate 
- Employment rate of 
older workers. 
- Average exit age from 
the labour force 
- Unemployment rate 
- Long-term 
unemployment rate 
- At-risk-poverty rate before social 
transfers. 
- At-risk-poverty rate after social 
transfers. 
- Inequality of income distribution. 
- At-persistent risk of poverty rate. 
- Children aged 0-17 living in 
jobless households. 





- Tax rate on low  wage earners :tax rate on 
labour cost.  
- Tax rate on low  wage earners: 
unemployment trap 
- Serious accidents at work 
- Fatal accidents at work 
- Dispersion of regional 
employment rates 
- Gender pay gap in unadjusted form 
GREATER SOCIAL COHESION 
Combating climate change  
- Total greenhouse gas emissions 
Use energy more efficienly  
- Energy intensity of the economy 
Decouple transport growth 
from economic growth 
Improve urban air quality 
Decrease waste generations 
and harmful disposal 
- Transport volume of freight 
transport relative to GDP. 
- Volume of passenger transport 
relative to GDP. 
- Population exposure to air 
pollution (by ozone, by 
particular matter). 
Progress towards more 
environmentally-friendly 
transport modes  
- Modal split of freight transports. 
- Modal split of  passenger 
- transports: Percentage share 
-  of cars. 
- Municipal waste (collected, 
landfilled, incinerated) 
Protect biodiversity  
- Fish stocks in European 
marine waters. 
- Protected areas for 
biodiversity (Habitats 







- Comparative price levels  
- Price convergence  
- Public procurement 
- Trade integration of goods 
- Trade integration of services 
- FDI intensity 
Market efficiency
- Price of telecommunications (local calls, national 
calls, calls to US) 
- Electricity prices (industrial users; households) 
- Gas prices (industrial users; households) 
- Market share of the largest generator in the 
electricity market. 
- Market share of the incumbent in fixed 
telecommunication's (local calls, long distance calls, 
international calls) 
- Market share of the leading operator in mobile 
telecommunications 
- Business demography (birth  rate of enterprises, 
survival rate of enterprises, death rate of enterprises)
Private 
investment effort
Distorsions in the Single 
Market 
- Business investment as a 
percentage of GDP 
- Sectoral and ad hoc State Aid 






















































As noted in the previous Chapter, the progress of the Lisbon
Strategy is rather slow and there is little sign that Europe’s 
economic decline is stopping or turning around, particularly 
in the large countries of continental Europe. There is also 
substantial agreement on what should be done to improve the 
long run economic outlook, at least at a general level. Yet, the 
economic reforms that are needed are not being implemented, 
or they are enacted too slowly. What can be done to speed up 
the pace of reforms? What are the most urgent priorities? In 
particular, what role should the EU play in bringing about
supply side reforms? In which areas of supply side policy, if 
any, is the need for European coordination more acute?  How 
can the current institutional framework for coordination of 
supply side policies be improved?  These are the issues 
addressed in this Chapter.  
We start by discussing the rationale for coordinating supply 
side policies. We conclude that, with one important 
exception, there is no general case for supply-side policy 
coordination. The presumption is that each country benefits 
from conducting effective supply-side policies without 
hurting its partners, possibly even bringing general benefits. 
Competition via supply-side policies is a priori desirable, 
since countries can learn from each other’s experiments and 
have stronger incentives to compete and enact efficiency 
enhancing policies. The exception concerns policies that 
enforce and guarantee equal access to the Single market to all 
producers, such as policies that fight state aid or other 
competitive distortions. Here there is a clear benefit from 
centralization, which alone can exploit the conflict of interest 
among organized interests located in different countries. 
We then consider the recent macroeconomic performance of 
the EU, comparing it to that of the US and reviewing labour 
markets performance and productivity growth. We identify 
three specific policy areas in need of reform: labour market 
institutions, deregulation and completion of the single market, 
and  policies towards research and higher education. For each 
of these areas, we ask what should be the role of the EU level 
of government and how the Lisbon strategies can be 
improved. We reach three main conclusions.  
First, centralization is certainly needed in the  area of the 
Single Market. Here the main challenge is to complete the 
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energy. This means dismantling barriers that achieve market 
segmentation along national borders, opening up markets for 
services to foreign providers, facilitating cross border 
mergers, shutting down state aid and regulations that prevent 
foreign entry, in some cases forcing divestitures and 
privatizations. To achieve this goal, the soft approach of the 
Lisbon Strategy should be abandoned, in favour of a stronger 
delegation of enforcement and regulatory powers to the 
European Commission (or possibly to European independent 
agencies).  A single European policymaker is less likely to be 
captured by national lobbies than national governments, 
because it will face countervailing pressures from a variety of 
producers throughout the EU. Moreover, its mission can be 
easily defined according to technical or efficiency criteria, so 
that one of his main goals is to strengthen and enforce the 
integration of segmented national markets.   
Second, centralization cannot and should not be strengthened 
in the area of labour markets. Here the challenge is not to 
achieve market integration, but rather to remove specific (and 
idiosyncratic) distortions from each national labour market. 
The EU can only have a limited role, both because there are 
no or few externalities, and because policy decisions entail 
delicate tradeoffs between efficiency and redistribution that 
can only be made through the national political process. Only 
national governments and legislatures have the political 
legitimacy to make final decisions in this controversial area. 
Nevertheless, the OCM can be reinforced, essentially by 
adding national political pressure to the peer pressure already 
present in the Lisbon Strategy. This can be achieved by 
sharpening the focus of the OCM around a few important 
benchmarks and indicators of labour market performance, 
and then forcing national parliaments to debate the 
performance of their governments in light of these European 
comparisons.  
Third, in the area of research and tertiary education, 
governments should be encouraged to pursue bold reforms 
through the creation of new universities and research centres. 
Gradual and piecemeal reforms are unlikely to work, both 
because of internal opposition from the establishment, and 
because success is more likely  if scarce resources are 
concentrated in the few institutions that can attract a critical 
mass of researchers.  Governments should learn a few lessons 
from their experience with labour market reforms. In this 
politically difficult area, successful reforms have been 
implemented through the creation of dual structures: the 
rights of the insiders have been preserved, while new and 
more flexible legislation changed the rules for new 
employees. The same dual approach should be pursued in the 
area of research and education. Rather than trying to radically 
change existing universities, member states should set up new 
research institutions under new rules and with additional 
resources. Here too, the initiative should mainly come from
member states, not from the EU. But this novel approach 
should be encouraged at the European level, through some 
coordination and by providing matching grants for the 
countries that are willing to go along this path. 
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This paper proposes an accounting assessment of hourly labour 
productivity growth, in an international perspective, focusing 
more particularly on information and communication 
technologies (ICT).  ICT, viewed as all-purpose technologies, is
associated with a third industrial revolution, as these increase 
growth potential and bring about productivity gains. Therefore, 
ICT is a key element within the Lisbon Strategy.  
Three factors contribute to hourly productivity growth: capital 
deepening (the ratio between capital services and hours 
worked), labour quality (labour services divided by hours 
worked) and total factor productivity (TFP). Factor quality 
(capital and labour) is taken into account through a translog 
function. Non residential capital is broken down into six assets: 
three ICT assets (hardware, software, communications 
equipment) and three non ICT assets (transport equipment, 
other equipment and structures). Hours worked are also 
decomposed by gender, age (4 categories) and education (6 
categories). These decompositions allow then the contributions 
of the various characteristics to the hourly labour productivity 
to be computed and the “quality” of each factor of production to 
be enhanced. 
In this type of exercise, price measurement is quite essential to 
explain what is at stake, as the quality of ICT capital keeps 
increasing over time. Hedonic methods, used to estimate the 
price of ICT, allow the dramatic fall in hardware prices and the 
corresponding increase in volumes to be identified. These 
methods, widespread in the United States, are still less popular 
in Europe. In order then to harmonise price measurement with 
the US, it was decided to apply the ratio of American ICT 
prices to non ICT prices to the other countries’ non ICT price 
series. 
The results for: the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Germany and France reveal a split line between countries. The 
four countries display total factor productivity gains but 
paradoxically, over the 1995-2001 period, they are the weakest 
in the United States and the United Kingdom. Over the nineties, 
TFP gains accelerate in France, in Germany and in the United 
States. In contrast, they slow down in the United Kingdom, 
although from a high level over the 1990-1995 period. Hourly 
labour productivity gains are comparable across the four 
countries, but the highest contribution of ICT in the United 
States (0.91 point of percentage) and in the United Kingdom 
(0.85 point) is compensated then by lower TFP gains in both 
countries. The evolution of the labour quality contribution 
underlines too the possible mismatch between labour and 
capital, entailing then lower TFP gains, as the increase in 
unskilled labour (as measured by education) in the United 
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States brings about a deterioration of labour quality over 
the 1995-01 period. In France, the fall in labour quality is
due to demographics, with the workers aged 54 and more 
leaving the labour market. 
This having been said, allowing for the heterogeneity of 
sectors, it cannot be concluded yet that there is no 
correlation between ICT investment and productivity gains. 
The sectoral analysis carried out for France, the United 
Kingdom and the United States shows that productivity 
gains were especially large in ICT-producer industries, in 
each of these countries. Hourly labour productivity in the 
ICT producing sector grows by between 12 and 14 % in the 
three countries between 1995 and 2001. Productivity gains 
show also a marked acceleration over the nineties. 
Accordingly, TFP gains increase also at a sustained pace. 
In the ICT-user sector, service industries, the productivity 
acceleration over the second half of the nineties is 
generalised and strong (except in the United Kingdom in 
terms of hours). In the United Kingdom, and even more in 
the United States, the levels reached during the past period 
are astonishing for industries belonging to the service 
sector, with average yearly gains by respectively 2.41 and 
3.87% for hourly labour productivity, 1.65 and 2.54 points 
of % for TFP. These unusual levels suggest huge 
productivity spill-over effects linked to ICT are underway, 
to the extent that the contribution of ICT capital deepening 
is great in both cases (0.66 and 0,99 point of % per year 
respectively). It is noteworthy that the strong TFP gains 
recorded in the user sector in these two countries point to 
spill-over effects not limited to the producer sector.  
Large productivity gains are mainly found in trade and 
banking and this is in accordance with the findings by 
Bosworth and Triplett (2003) for the US. Business services 
record negative productivity gains in all countries. 
Strikingly enough, these large productivity gains in terms 
of TFP are not found in the French user-sector (-0.61 point 
of %). They are indeed negative in all the user industries 
except trade, namely in banking and finance (-3.65 points), 
although the ICT capital deepening contribution is very 
high in this industry. This result may not be robust due to 
measurement issues and the different methods applied 
across countries to measure production of services. But 
there can also be some rigidities in French markets that 
prevent productivity gains to spill over. 
The spill-over effects found in the US and UK may, indeed, 
have benefited from a more competitive environment in 
both countries. As a matter of fact, regulation of activities 
that hinders the creation of firms, price setting and the 
mode of providing services could have a negative impact 
on employment and innovation in new sectors. If 
competition is stifled, then the urge to invest in new 
technologies that would pop up in a competitive context is 
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crushed. It could limit too the need to enlarge the variety of 
services offered to customers through electronic commerce.
In France, the negative productivity gains in the banking 
and finance sector and the weakness of those in the trade 
sector compared with the United States can also point to 
rigidities in the labour market on the one hand and to a 
different structure of industries on the other hand. As a 
matter of fact, longer opening hours of shops have an 
impact on work organisation and can contradict the labour 
legislation. Moreover, in France, the structure of the retail 
trade industry is quite different than the one prevailing in 
the United States, as the French industry entails much 
smaller units. As for the banking industry, its apparent 
capital and labour mismatch will be alleviated by 
demographics, to the extent that the exit out the labour 
market by senior workers will be supplemented by entries 
of more skilled newcomers.  
France has, nevertheless, dramatically relaxed market 
regulations over time. It should then invest more in ICT in 
the future to manage the set-up of new organisations and 
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Does deregulation in factor markets affect the path 
of long term growth? 
According to modern growth theories, policy and institutional 
settings have an impact on the path of long term economic 
growth. To some extent, regulation is necessary to ensure the 
functioning of market economies, for example in the areas of 
competition, consumer protection, property rights and 
environment. Institutions can increase efficiency by 
correcting market failure. On the other hand, overregulation 
might worsen resource allocation and the incentives for 
innovation, thereby exerting adverse effects on long term 
growth. 
Institutional reforms change the overall framework of 
economic activities. They operate through different channels. 
First, a higher degree of competition forces prices to 
converge to marginal costs. Factor inputs are used more 
efficiently, and the allocation of goods and services is 
improved. Companies are encouraged to reorganize work and 
reduce slack. Lower entrance barriers move market shares 
from firms with lower productivity to more competitive ones. 
Second, incentives to research and innovate may be 
improved. The absorptive capacities of firms to learn about 
advances in the leading edge and to move the technological 
frontier are extended. Advances in the allocation of resources 
and output are static, as they represent one-time changes in 
the productivity level. Thus, the acceleration of productivity 
growth is limited to a relatively short period. In contrast, 
gains from innovation are dynamic and can boost 
productivity over a longer period of time. Innovation involves 
complementarity of goods, positive spillovers to other 
industries, and the diffusion of new ideas. Apart from private 
returns, high macroeconomic returns on R&D and education 
are expected. 
Properly designed institutions support economic growth 
mainly through these channels. While this fact is well 
established by sound theoretical models, empirical evidence 
is not so clear-cut. Thus, the paper focuses on the empirical 
link between institutions and growth. Due to data availability, 
regulations on factor (labour, capital) markets are considered. 
Series are taken from the database of the Fraser Institute. 
Models of conditional convergence are used to assess their 
impact on GDP per capita growth. Here, the average rate of 
economic growth is explained by the level of initial income, 
deregulation indicators and other determinants of the 
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Different panel estimation techniques are applied to obtain 
robust results. For random effects and pooled regression
models, the results suggest that stronger deregulation will 
support long term growth, if reforms take place on the labour 
market. This effect is lost in fixed effects models, see Table 
7.1. The different outcome might be explained by the fact that 
institutions do not show sufficient variation over the sample 
period. They behave almost like constants, implying 
multicollineariy problems in the fixed effects setting. 
Furthermore, measurement errors might have biased the 
results. In particular, the composition of the regulation 
indicators has changed over time: variations in individual 
countries ratings may not imply a change in the degree of 
regulation, but rather the fact that some components of the 
index are missing in some years and in others not. To 
overcome this problem, the overall index of economic 
freedom is considered. This index is unbiased, as it has been 
computed backwards in a consistent way. But it is not strictly 
limited to the deregulation issue. The overall index includes 
the government size, the legal system and security of property 
rights, the access to sound money and freedom to trade with 
foreigners as additional series. As these series do not differ 
very much across the EU countries, the overall index can be 
considered as a proxy for regulation. 
If measurement errors are controlled for, the random and 
fixed effects models lead to similar results, see Table 7.2. 
Lagged income exerts a stronger negative impact on average 
GDP per capita growth, and advances in deregulation will 
improve the macroeconomic record. Therefore, the 
insignificant or even reversed findings in previous studies are 
likely affected by measurement errors. 
Using a growth accounting framework, the impact of 
institutions is expected to materialize mainly through the 
capital deepening channel, while the impact on the TFP rate 
is negligible, see Tables 7.3 and 4 in the long version of the 
paper. This points to the relevance of institutions during the 
catching-up process to the technological frontier. In contrast, 
the impact of institutions on steady state growth seems to be 
almost insignificant. In fact, the link to the TFP rate might be 
more complex and may be transmitted through the 
determinants of technological progress, including R&D and 























errors are controlled 
for, results seems to 
be unique. More 
deregulation fosters 
growth, in particular 
















Table 7.1: Impacts of factor market deregulation on income per capita growth 
A. Random effects specification 




  (0.005) 
0.001 
(0.001) 











  (0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 









B. Fixed effects specification 
 Constant Y(-t) CMR LMR R-squared 
0.011 
  (0.007) 
-0.000 
  (0.002) 
 0.20 4-year averages 
0.015 





  (0.006) 
-0.005 
 (0.002) 













  (0.006) 
 -0.003 
  (0.002) 
0.49 
Regressions explain the average growth rate of GDP per capita, where the average is computed either over a 4- or 8-year period. Y(-t) is log per capita 
income t=4 or t=8 years ago, respectively. CMR, LMR= labour, capital market deregulation, R-squared is the adjusted coefficient of determination. 
Standard errors in parantheses. 
 
Table 7.2: Impacts of the economic freedom index on income per capita growth 
A. Random effects specification 
 Constant Y(-t) EFI R-squared 
4-year averages 0.445 
(0.100) 
-0.029 
  (0.007) 
0.009 
  (0.002) 
0.23 
8-year averages 0.620 
(0.098) 
-0.040 
  (0.006) 
0.009 
  (0.002) 
0.52 
 
B. Fixed effects specification 
 Constant Y(-t) EFI R-squared 
4-year averages -0.043 
  (0.016) 
0.014 















  (0.015) 
0.015 
  (0.004) 
0.53 
Regressions explain the average growth rate of GDP per capita, where the average is computed either over a 4- or 8-year period. Y(-
t) is log per capita income t=4 or t=8 years ago, respectively. EFI= index of economic freedom, chain version, R-squared is the 










































The impact of institutions on the employment 
performance in European labour markets, 1979-
2001 
Rigidities in national labour markets are widely seen as 
responsible for the weak employment performance in Europe. 
The average unemployment rate is around 8 percent, and is 
predicted to be stable at this level for the near future. According 
to OECD measures, a substantial part is due to long term 
unemployment: 45 percent of the unemployed are unemployed 
for longer than 12 month. Despite a gradual decline in the mid 
1990s the rates are highly persistent. The high unemployment 
rates are accompanied by lower employment and participation 
rates. Currently, EU15 employment rates are 65 percent, which is 
not far below the Lisbon goal (70 percent). But, the gaps are 
wider for young people, older workers and women. Long-term 
unemployment rates exceed the average especially in Germany, 
Italy and Spain. Employment rates are relatively low in Belgium, 
Greece, Italy and Spain. The correlation between the long term 
unemployment and employment rate is –0.8 over the last decade. 
Hence, the unemployment problem is not caused by higher 
participation. 
To some extent, labour market institutions might account for this 
outcome. It is widely acknowledged that proper institutions are of 
key importance for the smooth working of the labour market. 
Information problems for both workers and firms generate 
imperfections in matching and monitoring processes. Different 
degrees of market power of wage contractors and the risk of 
becoming unemployed require an appropriate mix of the 
institutional framework. However, regulations also introduce 
rigidities which can impede the reallocation of labour in case of 
structural shocks. Overly restrictive elements may actually 
worsen the employment performance. Examples of labour market 
institutions include employment protection legislation, the system 
of wage bargaining including the strength of trade unions and 
benefits in favour of the unemployed. 
The focus of this paper is on the impact of institutions on the 
employment performance, which is measured in different ways. 
In addition to the participation and part-time rate, the threshold of 
employment is considered: due to productivity gains, output 
growth has to exceed a certain level to create new jobs. The 
threshold is inversely related to the marginal intensity of 
employment to output growth, that is, the elasticity of 
employment growth with respect to output growth. 
As both parameters are not observable they have to be estimated 
in advance, taking into account their variability over time. The 
impact of institutions is investigated within a panel econometric 
model, where country individual fixed effects and business cycle 
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The empirical results are more or less reasonable. For example, 
higher union power and stricter employment protection are expected 
to lower the employment rate, see table 8.1. This might reflect 
behaviour of labour demand. Provided that union power increases 
wages above the competitive equilibrium, employment prospects are 
worsened, leading to a decline in participation. A rise in the tax 
wedge and a more generous unemployment benefit system will 
reduce the employment rate, emphasizing the relevance of policies 
that increase the incentives for households to work. 
Higher union densities raise the threshold of employment, especially 
when unemployment benefits are more generous, see table 8.2. This 
effect is partly offset by a high degree of coordination in wage 
bargaining. An increase in the tax wedge will lower the threshold, 
because it slows down the TFP rate. In an economic upturn, the 
threshold is reduced, given that countries do not have extensive 
employment protection schemes. 
Employment protection legislation is most important for the marginal 
intensity, see table 8.3. Stronger employment protection will reduce 
the job content of output growth. The best fitting models point to 
some interaction of employment protection with other institutional 
and business cycle variables. A decline in the marginal intensity is 
expected, if union power is high, and the unemployment benefit 
system is more generous. Higher levels of coordination tend to raise 
the marginal intensity of employment. A better consideration of the 
macroeconomic situation in wage negotiations can activate jobs to a 
larger extent, especially at the lower income range. 
Policies should be directed to introduce more flexibility in labour 
markets. Compared to the current setting, a less stringent employment 
protection legislation is favourable, while both the need for flexibility 
and security have to be taken into account. The tax and transfer 
systems should be more aligned to support the incentives for 
households to work. In addition, fiscal consolidation is important, as 
it is a precondition for cutting taxes in the medium and long run. 
Some progress has been made in recent years due to the liberalisation 
of temporary contracts with low separation costs and exceptions for 
small enterprises and business startups. In the field of employment 
protection legislation, the use of temporary work arrangements has 
been eased, while protection of regular employment remained mostly 
unaltered. Instead of partial reforms, the results point to a more 
comprehensive strategy, as interactions between institutions often 
turn out to be significant. 
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Table 8.1: Effects of labour market institutions on the employment rate 
 Coefficient t-value (absolute) 
UDS -0.397 7.92 
EPL -0.045 2.88 
TAX*BRR -0.324 4.02 
ALMP*BRR -0.025 2.04 
GP  0.525 5.04 
COO*GY  0.177 4.49 
Adjusted R2 0.90 
 
Table 8.2: Effects of labour market institutions on the threshold of employment 
 Coefficient t-value (absolute) 
UDS  0.041 3.49 
UDS*BRR  0.117 8.42 
COO -0.005 2.59 
TAX -0.058 4.02 
GP -0.229 4.48 
GP*EPL  0.179 6.14 
Adjusted R2 0.81 
 
Table 8.3: Effects of labour market institutions on the marginal intensity of employment 
 Coefficient t-value (absolute) 
COO  0.314 7.06 
EPL*UDS -0.358 3.18 
EPL*BRR -0.476 6.76 
GP*EPL -0.515 1.96 
Adjusted R2 0.80 
 
Panel stimation with country fixed effects. ALMP=Active labour market policy, BRR=benefit replacement rate, COO =bargaining 
coordination, EPL=employment protection legislation, TAX=tax wedge, UDS=trade union density, GY=growth rate gross value 
added, GP= CPI inflation. Employment rates obtained from OECD Labour Market Statistics, Gross value added and CPI from the 




































































This chapter considers the proposition that markets in the euro
area economies have become more competitive with the advent 
of the euro. The increased competition stems from more 
transparent price comparisons and the removal of both 
exchange rate risk and the buying and selling spreads in foreign 
exchange markets. These changes lower the total cost and 
uncertainty to consumers of purchasing goods produced or sold 
in other euro area countries and make markets more integrated. 
How might the increased competition manifest itself? In 
response to the now relatively cheaper imports, firms may 
lower their prices and markup. One could imagine the extreme 
case where prices and the markup fall so that relative prices in 
each country are unaffected by the introduction of the euro 
meaning that the distribution of sales remains the same and 
measures of industry concentration are unaffected. Another 
response may be for firms to merge which would reduce 
competition and lead to an increase in prices and the markup. 
Therefore, there may be two opposing forces on both the 
markup and competition following the introduction of the euro.
The difficulty is to judge whether competition has on balance 
increased in the face of these opposing forces. One way to 
proceed is to focus on the market outcome in terms of the 
firm’s surplus profit, or in practical terms, the markup. A fall in 
the markup implies that there is a net benefit to consumers and 
a net loss to firms which is consistent with the outcome that 
would ensue if there was an increase in competition. 
Therefore, one indirect measure of competition would be the 
markup such that a decrease in the markup, all else equal, is 
concomitant with a net increase in competition.   
The two panels in Figure 9.1 show the aggregate unit cost 
markup of the GDP implicit price deflator on unit labour costs 
for eight of the eleven euro area countries in January 1999. 
The line labelled ‘Euro area 7’ on each figure is a weighted 
average markup of the eight markups less that of Finland.  The 
figures indicate that this measure of the markup (which is the 
inverse of labour’s income share) has varied widely over the 
past twenty or so years but has in general increased by between 
5 per cent (France) and 20 per cent (Italy). Even though there 
are long periods of decline in the markup for some counties 
(notably Finland and Spain in the late 1980s and early 1990s), 
the markup does in general increase for all the countries. This 
results in the weighted average markup represented as ‘Euro 
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and March 2003. Of some interest is the relative stability of the 
markup for the countries in the top panel of the figure (Austria, 
Belgium, France and Germany) compared with the countries in 
the lower panel (Finland, Italy, Netherlands and Spain). 
Of more interest for our purposes is the general decline in the 
markup that is evident in the figures since the introduction of
the euro in January 1999. The markup increased by 3 ¼ per 
cent in Austria, zero per cent in Germany and fell in the 
remaining countries.  Overall the weighted average markup, 
‘Euro area 7’, has fallen by ¾ of a percentage point between 
December 1988 and March 2003. 
The decline in the markup since the introduction of the euro 
can be demonstrated more formally by estimating a static 
model of the markup where the markup is regressed on a 
constant and two linear trends.  The first trend is for the full 
sample while the other is a short trend, which runs between 
March 1999, and the end of the sample to model the potential 
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Figure 9.1: Markup of Price on Unit Labour Costs 
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The markup is counter-
cyclical and empirically 
is negatively correlated 
with inflation 
The estimates of the short-trend for each country show that in 
five of the countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the 
Netherlands) the markup declines after the introduction of the 
euro.  This leaves one country where the markup increased after 
January 1999 (Austria) and two where there is no significant 
change (Finland and Spain).  The weighted average decrease in 
the markup after the introduction of the euro, ‘Euro area 7’ is at 
a rate of around ¾ of a percentage point per annum. 
We might conclude therefore from the figures and the results of 
the short-trend regressions that there is prima facie evidence 
that there has been a decline in the markup following the 
introduction of the euro and that this decline is consistent with 
an increase in competition.  However, to examine this issue 
more fully it is necessary to account for other influences that 
may have affected the markup since March 1999 so as to 
determine the extent of the decline in the markup that can be 
attributed to the introduction of the euro alone.  It is these other 
influences to which we now turn. 
Two major influences on the markup are considered extensively 
in the literature.  The first is the business cycle and the second 
is inflation.  The influences of inflation and the business cycle 
on the markup are evident in the figures below for the euro 
area.  In Figure 9.2 we can observe the counter-cyclical nature 
of the markup.  In particular the strong upward movements of 
the business cycle variable coincide with falls in the markup 
series and vice versa.  Furthermore, we see in Figure 9.3 that 
annual inflation declines over the sample by around 15 
percentage points accompanied with an increase in the markup 
of around 10 per cent. 
 We therefore conjecture that the apparent trend increase in the 
markup over the whole period can largely be explained by the 
decline in inflation and does not necessarily reflect structural 
changes in the economy.  Similarly, the change in the behaviour 
of the markup following the introduction of the euro may also 
be explained by developments in inflation and the business 









Figure 9.2:  The Business Cycle and the Markup 




























Euro Zone 7 LHS Business Cycle RHS  
Note: the business cycle is defined as actual unemployment rate less Hodrick-Prescott filtered unemployment rate.  
 
Figure 9.3:  Inflation and the Markup 































































































The long-run structure of our model is given by: 
pqmu ∆−= λ  (1) 
where mu  is the markup of price on unit labour costs, q  is the 
‘gross’ markup, λ  is the parameter that measures the trade-off 
in the long run between inflation and the markup and referred to 
as the inflation cost coefficient, and p is the price level. 
Lower-case variables denote natural logarithms and ∆
represents the first change in the series.  The markup is 
calculated as ulcp −  where the price level, p , is the gross
domestic product (GDP) implicit price deflator and ulc  is a 
measure of unit labour costs.  The long-run can be nested 
within a single equation error correction model which captures 
the short-run behaviour of inflation and the markup around the 















where bc is the business cycle variable measured as the 
difference between the unadjusted and Hodrick-Prescott filtered 
unemployment series and t is a trend. The model was estimated 
for the period December 1982 to March 2003 for seven euro
area countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Germany, 
Netherlands, Spain, and for a weighted average of these seven 
countries, ‘Euro area 7’ using quarterly data taken from the 
OECD data compendium. These seven countries make up 
around 95 per cent of the euro area measured at constant price 
GDP in 1995.  As we are concerned about the endogeneity 
status of two of the right hand side variables, namely 1−∆ tp  and 
1−tbc , we estimate (2) using instrumental variables where 
lagged values of the regressors are used as instruments. 
Estimating (2) should account for the influences of inflation and 
the business cycle on the markup.  Any trending behaviour of 
the kind discussed in Section 1 due to either structural changes 
in the economy or the introduction in the euro should therefore 
remain in the estimated residual series, tε̂ .  Thus regressing tε̂
on a constant and shift variable, i.e. 
tt Shift νγγε ++= 10ˆ  (3) 
should reveal significant coefficients for these right-hand-side 
variables if a structural component is missing from the model 
given by (2) which may be consistent with the change in the 
trending behaviour of the markup with the introduction of the 
euro. 
The results show that for five of the seven countries considered 
and for the ‘Euro area 7’ series, inflation and the business cycle 
have a significant role to play in explaining behaviour of the 
markup.  In more detail we see that that the annualised long-run 
coefficient on annual inflation ranges between 1.3 and 1.7 
which is consistent with results reported in earlier empirical 
studies.  In particular, for the euro area over this period, a fall in 
annual inflation of 1 percentage point corresponds to a rise in 
the markup of around 1.3 per cent.  We also find that other than 
for Austria where the markup increases following the 
Econometric evidence 
suggests that after 
controlling for the 
influence of the 
business cycle and 
inflation on the 
markup, the 
introduction of the 
euro no longer plays a 
significant role in 






















































introduction of the euro (at the 10 per cent level of 
significance), there is no significant shift in the residual series 
in (3).  Consequently, we cannot identify any change in the 
markup after March 1999 if we control for the effects of 
inflation and the business cycle.  
We show that although the markup has varied considerably
since the introduction of the euro most of this variation can be 
explained by the movement of inflation and the business cycle. 
Therefore if we take changes in the markup as a proxy for 
changes in competitiveness we do not find any evidence of a 
pro-competitive impact of the creation of the euro area.  This 
may be due to the fact that we are still in a period of transition 
or that the data are insufficient for making the kinds of 
distinctions necessary. The impact of the euro on competition 
therefore remains an open question and one with considerable 
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Financial Integration Measure and Factor Analysis 
of European country and sector-based stock indexes
 
 
This chapter investigates the financial integration process in the 
euro area compared to the rest of the world over the last decade, 
an important area for the achievement of the targets of the 
Lisbon Strategy. Financial integration is expected to have risen 
more in the European Union due to the removal of various 
regulatory barriers and to the build up of the monetary union 
with a single monetary policy. These factors have triggered an 
impressive convergence of interest rates in the euro area. 
However the financial integration is debated as far as stock 
markets are concerned. On the one hand, there has been some 
integration of stock exchanges (for instance, with the creation
of Euronext); on the other one, tax treatments as well as 
regulations have often remained different across countries. For 
instance, the tax treatment of domestic stocks returns is 
generally more favourable than that of foreign stocks returns 
(the European Commission has recently urged EU members to 
correct this distortion). Hence there is a debate on whether 
stock markets are more integrated in the European Union (and 
more specifically in the euro area) than in the rest of the world. 
We analyse the dynamics of daily returns for 90 country-and-
sector indices in Europe as well as in the rest of the world. 
Returns are extracted from the Datastream database. They cover 
eleven countries from the euro area (all but Luxemburg), three 
countries from the EU not in the euro area (the UK, Denmark 
and Sweden), and six other countries or zones (Canada, the 
United States, Australia, Switzerland, Norway, Japan, and Asia 
excluding Japan). The time span runs from 1990:1 to 2002:08. 
In order to cancel out the effect of exchange rate variations, 
returns are expressed in euros (or Ecus) for euro area countries, 
and in dollars for all other countries. Hence, the integration 
measure of each zone (euro area, rest of the world) is not 
affected by exchange-rate variations. 
Dynamic factor analysis allows to identify common factors in 
the dynamics of daily returns, using a rolling window of one or 
three years successively. Using the Bai and Ng (2002) 
information criteria, we show that the number of relevant 
factors in the euro area has been decreasing over the period. 
This can be interpreted as higher integration in the euro area. 
More precisely, the number of factors falls from 4 to 3 in the 
middle of 1994, and from 3 to 2 at the beginning of 1998. 
In a second step, the share of the co-variance matrix explained 
by the first factor is used as a dynamic measure of integration. 
Financial integration is 
important to achieve 
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We show that this first factor explains the bulk of the co-
movements of all returns, revealing a high degree of integration 
over the whole sample. However this measure of integration is 
always higher in the euro area than in the rest of the world. Its 
fluctuations over time are also more pronounced in the euro area, 
with a sharp rise in 1998-1999 and a subsequent decline in 2000-
2001. 
The last step consists in disentangling the contribution of 
countries and of sectors respectively to the integration measure. 
To do this, we conduct the same analysis as in the second step, 
but either on sector indices (which are aggregated across 
countries) or on country indices (which are aggregated across 
sectors). It is found that countries play a dominant role in driving 
the common part of all returns dynamics. For the euro area, our 
measure of integration across countries rises sharply in 1997-
1998; it then declines slightly. For the rest of the world, 
integration rises only slightly in 1997-1998, and stays constant. 
We conclude that financial integration has been at play in the 
euro area in the 1997-1998 period, and that integration has 
remained at a high level afterwards. 
Conversely, the sector-based integration measure tends to decline 
over the period, both in the euro area and in the rest of the world. 
The fall is especially marked in 1999-2000, probably due to the 
burst of the internet bubble. 
 
At the beginning of the period, the sector component is dominant 
in explaining the co-movements of the returns. This is no longer 
true at the end of the period for the euro area, due to the scissor 
evolution of the country-based integration (which rises) and of 
the sector-based integration (which declines). At the end of the 
period, the integration measure is about the same for countries 
and for sectors in the euro area. 
 
One implication of our study is that the scope for sector-based 
portfolio diversification has been rising over time in the euro area
compared to country-based diversification. However our orders of 
magnitude tend to suggest that countries still offer diversification 
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